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PROFESSOR BAINBRIDGE AND THE ARROWIAN MOMENT:
A REVIEW OF THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE
BY BRETT H. MCDONNELL*
ABSTRACT
The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice, a new book
by Stephen Bainbridge, pulls together the leading arguments for director
primacy that Bainbridge has made in a series of articles. In his core
argument, Bainbridge uses theoretical work by Kenneth Arrow to explain
the attractions of the separation of ownership and control with a centralized
hierarchy headed by a board of directors. Bainbridge posits that achieving
an optimal trade-off between authority and accountability is the central
problem of corporate law. He uses a key passagefrom Arrow to argue that
in making this trade-off, lawmakers should always make a presumption in
favor of preserving managerial authority. This article examines Bain-
bridge's argument, and shows that he does not succeed in justifying this
presumption. Arrow's argument persuasively shows why rules that lead to
constant review of all board decisions would effectively eliminate board
authority, and that this would be unattractive. None of the major pro-
accountability reform proposals currently in play, however, comes even
close to eliminating board authority. Arrow's argument cannot tell us
whether reform in favor of somewhat more accountability at the expense of
some loss in authority, but far from a total loss in authority, is a good idea
or not. That is, Bainbridge's use of Arrow does not help us determine the
wisdom of current reform proposals. Bainbridge's attempt to use Arrow
thus falls short of his target. Bainbridge has other, less original, arguments
which supplement his core argument for board authority. This article
considers the leading supplementary arguments as well, and also finds them
wanting. The article ultimately moves beyond a critique of Bainbridge to
argue more affirmatively for greater accountability for boards.
*Professor and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of Minnesota Law School.
I thank Claire Hill, Paul Rubin, participants at the Midwestern Law and Economics Association
annual conference, and especially Stephen Bainbridge for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Large public corporations are hierarchical organizations. At the apex
of the hierarchy stands the board of directors. Most formal legal authority
within the corporation is vested in the board, although the board delegates
much of its authority to the top officers, who in turn delegate many decisions
to middle-level managers, and so on down the chain. These corporations
have created great wealth. They have, however, placed the control of that
wealth in the hands of a small number of people. This creates temptation:
what keeps those at the top working faithfully for the interests of their
organizations?
The mix of state and federal law that regulates corporate governance
in the United States faces two tasks at tension with each other. It must create
a flexible structure that allows those in positions of authority to effectively
manage these huge institutions, while also limiting their discretion to abuse
the trust reposed in them. How does, and how should, corporate law balance
these two tasks?
The heart of American corporate law resides in the Delaware General
Corporation Law and particularly in the judicial cases interpreting and
applying that law to Delaware corporations. This body of law is, of course,
complex and multilayered, but its central characteristic is the great degree of
authority it places in the board, and the great deference it shows to board
behavior exercising that authority. There are mechanisms in the law for
holding boards accountable for particularly egregious misuses of their
authority, but those mechanisms are quite limited. Shareholders do get a
voice in certain matters, but only a very few, and even then their voice is
sharply circumscribed. Corporate law must balance authority against
accountability but most of the time, in Delaware and the United States
generally, the law strikes that balance in favor of authority.
How should we balance authority and accountability? That is the
central normative question of corporate law. Interestingly enough, there is
not much corporate law scholarship that vigorously defends the strong way
in which American law vests authority in the board. Many corporate law
scholars argue for reforms that give more strength to legal accountability
mechanisms, such as shareholder voting, shareholder bylaws, or the ability
of shareholders to sue directors who violate their fiduciary duties to the
corporation. Even market-oriented, economics-trained scholars who tend to
defend existing law are rather hardpressed to explain and defend why that
law so rigidly entrenches strong board authority. The leading economics-
based theories see corporate law as providing useful default rules which
corporations should be able to contract around. The law, however, often
makes it hard to contract around the grant of authority to boards.
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The leading defense of this hardwired grant of authority to boards is
Stephen Bainbridge's director primacy theory. Starting early this decade, in
a series of articles' and a book,2 Bainbridge has laid out a core argument
concerning the trade-off between authority and accountability, and has
argued that most of the time the law should favor authority over account-
ability. He has then applied this argument to many of the leading topics in
corporate law, including shareholder voting,3 the business judgment rule,4
fiduciary duties,5 executive compensation,6 and the law governing hostile
takeovers. 7 Taken together, Bainbridge's work ties together American
corporate law and treats its core tendencies as a relatively coherent
intellectual whole that rightly takes board authority as its leading value.
Bainbridge has now published a new book which draws together his
core arguments for director primacy in one place, including many of his
applications of those arguments to leading topics in corporate law. Pulling
this material together in one book is a natural development-the exigencies
of law review scholarship entail repeating the same argument in multiple
articles before going on to apply that argument to specific topics. The book
allows Bainbridge to bring his full set of arguments together along with the
'Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1
(2002) [hereinafter Nexus]; Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention
Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83 (2004) [hereinafter Abstention Doctrine]; Stephen M. Bainbridge,
The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601 (2006) [hereinafter Voting
Rights]; Stephen M. Bainbridge et al., The Convergence of Good Faith and Oversight, 55 UCLA L.
REv. 559 (2008) [hereinafter Good Faith]; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy in Corporate
Takeovers: Preliminary Reflections, 55 STAN. L. REv. 791 (2002) [hereinafter Primacy in
Takeovers]; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119
HARv. L. REv. 1735 (2006) [hereinafter Shareholder Disempowerment]; Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 547 (2003)
[hereinafter Director Primacy]; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Much Ado About Little? Directors'
Fiduciary Duties in the Vicinity ofInsolvency, 1 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 335 (2007) [hereinafter Much
Ado]; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Precommitment Strategies in Corporate Law: The Case of Dead
Hand and No Hand Pills, 29 J. CORP. L. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Precommitment Strategies]; Stephen
M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769
(2006) [hereinafter Unocal at 20]; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Book Review Essay, Executive
Compensation: Who Decides?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1615 (2005) [hereinafter Executive Compensation]
(reviewing LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004)).
2STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS (2002).3See Voting Rights, supra note 1, at 619-28; Shareholder Disempowerment, supra note 1, at
1749-51.
4See Abstention Doctrine, supra note 1, at 102-04.
5See id. at 88-90; Good Faith, supra note 1, at 567-74.
6See generally Executive Compensation, supra note 1.
7See Primacy in Takeovers, supra note 1, at 809-11; Precommitment Strategies, supra note
1; Unocal at 20, supra note 1, at 818-28.
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major applications of those arguments to specific topics. The New
Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice (The New Corporate
Governance)8 thus provides a good chance to take a close look at Bain-
bridge's arguments.
Bainbridge makes a great advance in framing the debate over corpo-
rate governance as a trade-off between authority and accountability, and he
does an excellent job in extolling the benefits that authority brings. But,
does Bainbridge succeed in persuasively justifying the supreme value of
authority? No. This article first lays out Bainbridge's argument, and then
explains why that argument fails to succeed.
Bainbridge has a core argument which underlies all of his work in the
director primacy series. A key and welcome part of that argument is his
extensive reliance on a great book by Nobel Prize winner Kenneth Arrow,
The Limits of Organization.9 Indeed, bringing Arrow into the dialogue of
contemporary corporate law scholarship is, on its own, a great service.
10
Bainbridge uses Arrow to highlight the important role that hierarchical
authority plays within a large organization."' Such authority is often the only
way to process and disseminate information in a remotely efficient manner.
Bainbridge also uses Arrow to stress the inherent conflict between authority
and accountability. 12 Mechanisms used to hold a particular decision maker
accountable to those in whose interests he is supposed to act may undermine
authority if they allow the reviewer too much discretion in overturning
decisions of the reviewed.
Bainbridge also follows Arrow in stating that both authority and
accountability are important, and that any effective organization must
achieve a sensible balance between them.13 Prior economics-influenced
scholarship on corporate law largely focused on agency costs and account-
ability; Bainbridge changes that focus. Up to this point, I find Bainbridge's
argument both important and hard to argue with in any way beyond small
quibbles. But then a funny thing happens. In each of his articles, and now
8STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND
PRAIMCE (2008).
9KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION (1974).
1
°Michael Dooley predates Bainbridge in using Arrow and, indeed, anticipates much of
Bainbridge's core argument on the trade-off between efficiency and accountability. See Michael P.
Dooley, Two Models of Corporate Governance, 47 Bus. LAW. 461, 467 (1992). Bainbridge
regularly acknowledges Dooley's influence, including prominently in the acknowledgment section of
The New Corporate Governance. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at xiii.
"Director Primacy, supra note 1, at 557-58.
S2Id. at 557. Arrow actually uses the term "responsibility" rather than "accountability," but
Bainbridge normally uses the latter term. I follow Bainbridge's usage here.
"Id. at 573.
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in The New Corporate Governance, Bainbridge moves very, very quickly
from recognizing the tension between authority and accountability to arguing
that we should presume a legal structure that favors authority over
accountability, unless there are strong arguments against that presumption.
How does Bainbridge make that move? He does so with an argument
that I call "the Arrowian moment." A few particular sentences from The
Limits of Organization14 are the telltale tipoff that one has reached the
Arrowian moment in a Bainbridge article or book. The central work in each
piece of the director primacy series occurs in this moment. If it worked, it
would be a great achievement.
But it does not work. The argument that Bainbridge borrows from
Arrow only tells us that there is a trade-off between authority and account-
ability,"5 and that both have real value. It also tells us that it will generally
be unwise to choose a structure that eliminates authority completely in favor
of accountability, or vice versa. None of the major proaccountability reform
proposals currently in play, however, comes even close to eliminating board
authority. In the world in which we live today, Arrow's argument is not able
to tell us whether reform in favor of somewhat more accountability at the
expense of some, but far from a total, loss in authority is a good idea or not.
Bainbridge's attempt to use Arrow falls far short of his target.
Bainbridge has a variety of other subsidiary, less original arguments to
buttress his case for strengthened authority. He claims that the internal
dynamics of boards themselves lead to effective self-regulation. He points to
the use of various markets to make boards accountable. Bainbridge argues
that economic pressures tend to lead to optimal state corporate law. He
warns of the dangers of special interest shareholders. He claims that a legal
and economic structure that has survived a long time and accomplished
much is entitled to a presumption against serious change. Most of these
arguments, however, have been made in more detail elsewhere, and also
critiqued in much detail. Bainbridge's use of each argument does not get
him where his more original argument using Arrow is similarly unable to go.
Thus, the leading sustained defense of the American legal system's grant of
nearly unaccountable power to the board of directors falls short.
This article is organized as follows: Part I lays out the first part of
Bainbridge's basic argument, leading up to the Arrowian moment. Part Im
14ARROW, supra note 9, at 78 ("If every decision of A is to be reviewed by B, then all we
have really is a shift in the locus of authority from A to B and hence no solution to the original
problem.").
'
51d. ("To maintain the value of authority, it would appear that responsibility [or
accountability] must be intermittent.").
20091
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describes the moment itself, and the puzzle of how Bainbridge uses Arrow to
move from recognizing a trade-off between authority and accountability to
staking out a position in choosing between the two. Part IV examines
possible answers to this puzzle. First, Part IV looks at Bainbridge's use of
the Arrowian moment and argues that Arrow only supplies an argument
against extreme proposals that would attack authority altogether, and that
this does not fit existing corporate law reform proposals. The remainder of
Part IV examines a variety of other arguments that Bainbridge invokes to
defend the primacy of board authority, including self-regulation, board
internal dynamics, the use of market mechanisms, the race to the top in
corporate law, the dangers of special interest shareholders, and a Burkean
argument for sticking with the status quo. I argue that none of these
arguments succeed. Part V moves beyond a critique of Bainbridge to argue
more affirmatively for greater accountability for boards. This starts by
reflecting upon where Bainbridge goes right, and where he goes off track.
Arrow and the basic tension between authority and accountability is a
great starting point. Bainbridge, however, goes wrong by trying to privilege
one value over the other. Both truly matter. Moreover, if we consider the
political and economic forces underlying the evolution of corporate law, the
law will likely evolve to put too much emphasis on authority over
accountability. For a variety of reasons, corporate officers and directors are
likely to exercise undue influence over the political and legal process and,
thus, bend the law too far in their direction. Legal scholars, who are
relatively unbeholden to any special interests in this battle, should use
whatever limited influence they may have to try to reinforce the troops in
favor of accountability. Hence, they should argue for responsible, sensible
ways to increase board accountability. In the end, I argue that this is more
consistent with Arrow than Bainbridge's application of Arrow's great book.
11. BAINBRIDGE'S CORE ARGUMENT-THE LEAD-UP TO THE MOMENT
There is a lengthy core argument at the heart of Bainbridge's director
primacy theory, which he must repeat (law review publishing being what it
is) in every article and book in the director primacy series before applying
that argument to the specific topic at hand in each piece. The initial
Northwestern University Law Review16 and, to a lesser extent, Iowa Law
Review 17 articles lay out the basic argument. Then, in a series of articles and
16Director Primacy, supra note 1, at 552-63.
17Nexus, supra note 1, at 9-11.
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books, Bainbridge applies the argument to the leading topics of corporate
law-the business judgment rule,' 8 fiduciary duty in takeovers and
acquisitions, 19 shareholder voting power,20 and piercing the corporate veil,
21
among others.
The New Corporate Governance is laid out in five chapters plus an
introduction. Chapter one, "The Means and Ends of Corporate Govern-
ance," lays out Bainbridge's core conception of the corporation and develops
the first part of his argument for director primacy.22 Chapter two, "Why a
Board?," presents explanations for why a group rather than an individual is
at the top of the corporate pyramid.23 Chapter three, "Director Primacy in
the Courts," contains the core Arrowian moment in this book, and is really at
the heart of Bainbridge's argument.24 In this chapter Bainbridge applies his
arguments to the topics of fiduciary duties and takeover bids.25 Chapter four,
"The Shift from Managerialism to Director Primacy," is a more historical
section that aims to fend off criticisms that managerialism rather than board
primacy is a better descriptive theory of contemporary American corpo-
rations.26 The final chapter, "The Future of Corporate Governance: Director
or Shareholder Primacy," takes on current debates over efforts to increase
shareholder power within public corporations, and returns at the end to the
core Arrowian moment.27 In this review of Bainbridge's work I will consider
each of these chapters, although not always quite in the order that Bainbridge
follows in his book.
Bainbridge's books and articles lay out the best existing defense for
the great power that American corporate law puts in the hands of corporate
boards, and the correspondingly extremely limited power it gives share-
holders. They also represent the most extensive use in corporate law
scholarship of Kenneth Arrow's marvelous The Limits of Organization,28 in
18See generally Abstention Doctrine, supra note 1 (applying the director primacy theory to
the business judgment rule).
19See generally Primacy in Takeovers, supra note 1 (applying the director primacy theory to
corporate takeovers); Precommitment Strategies, supra note 1 (applying the director primacy theory
to poison pills); Unocal at 20, supra note 1 (applying the director primacy theory to corporate
takeovers).20See Voting Rights, supra note 1; Shareholder Disempowerment, supra note 1.
21See Much Ado, supra note 1.22BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 23-75.23Id. at 77-104.
241d. at 105-54.
25Id. at 111-14, 134.
26BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 155-200.271d. at 201-35.
28ARROW, supra note 9.
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itself a good enough reason to respect Bainbridge's accomplishment. 2' We
shall see, however, that Bainbridge's use of Arrow does not successfully get
him to where he wants to go.
Bainbridge's concept of director primacy has two main parts: (1) in
large public corporations the board of directors has, and should have,
ultimate decision-making power;30 and (2) the board's fiduciary duty runs to
shareholders and not to other corporate constituencies-that is, the board
should make its decisions in the best interests of shareholders rather than in
the interests of employees, creditors, the community, or so forth. 31 My
concern here is with the first part, namely who does and who should have
ultimate decision-making power in a public corporation.
For argument's sake I will accept the second part, that the duty runs to
shareholders only. This is the dominant position in American corporate law
scholarship, although I do not personally share it.32 In his new book, the
argument for this shareholder wealth maximization norm occurs in the last
part of the first chapter.33 Bainbridge argues that a shareholder wealth
maximization norm is what shareholders and other stakeholders in most
firms would bargain for if we were to ask for an explicit agreement on whose
interests a corporation should pursue.34 The main arguments he uses to
justify this hypothetical bargain have been around in the literature for a
while. Namely, he claims that shareholders, as the corporation's residual
claimants, are more vulnerable to director misconduct than other groups and
less able to protect themselves contractually. 35 Easterbrook, Fischel, and
Macey, among others, made these arguments in the late 1980s and early
1990s when the adoption of corporate constituency statutes led to a flair up
in the old debate over whose interests a corporation should pursue.36 Others
have already sharply called these arguments into question. For instance,
employees with firm-specific investments are also residual claimants, in
effect, and it is not at all clear that employees can protect their interests more
29Arrow's book played a big role in persuading me to go into economics. I nonetheless still
think it is a great work.
3 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 10; Director Primacy, supra note 1, at 550.31BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 10-11; Director Primacy, supra note 1, at 550.32See Brett H. McDonnell, Employee Primacy, or Economics Meets Civic Republicanism at
Work, 13 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 334, 338-39 (2008).33BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 57-72.
341d. at 66.351d. at 68-69.
36FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 92-93 (1991); Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various
Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21
STETSON L. REv. 23, 36 (1991).
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easily by contract than can shareholders.37 Most blatantly, shareholders of a
public corporation limit their exposure to any management team's mis-
behavior through diversification; employees cannot do that. Bainbridge does
not seriously come to terms with these responses. Bainbridge's final
argument is that other constituencies can protect themselves better through
political means than can shareholders.38 Is he serious? Do unions in the
United States today really possess "enormous political power"? 39 Are
shareholders as a class a more loosely defined group than employees?
Certainly shareholders include in their midst people who are much more
politically powerful and wealthy than employees as a group. This claim
needs a much more vigorous and detailed defense than Bainbridge provides.
So much, then, for the shareholder wealth maximization norm. My
main concern here is with the first part of director primacy, the argument
over who should exercise authority within corporations. Bainbridge's
argument for board control over corporate decision making is both a
descriptive and a normative claim. Descriptively, he argues that American
corporate law gives shareholders very little power over corporate decisions.
40
Normatively, he argues that board control is a good thing. 41 The descriptive
claim is right. Shareholders have very little power over corporate decisions.
Their main alleged power is the right to elect directors.42 As the current
controversy over shareholder voting and proxy access makes clear in
practice, however, this power is quite feeble in corporations with dispersed
shareholders (the type of corporation that Bainbridge focuses on). The
combination of state and federal law governing shareholder voting and proxy
solicitation makes it prohibitively expensive for shareholders to put up their
own candidates for the board, and they almost never do so except in the
(increasingly rare) case of a hostile takeover. Thus, boards nominate the
only candidates, and those candidates are guaranteed victory. This system
may be on the verge of major change, but that change is far from certain-
and Bainbridge is a vehement opponent.43
37Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283,305-06,
317-18 (1998); McDonnell, supra note 32, at 349-50; Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human Capital
Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78
CORNELL L. REv. 899, 907-08, 916-19 (1993).3 8BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 71-72.
3 9 1d. at 71.
4°1d. at 53-54.4 1See id. at 228-35.
42See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (b) (2001).43See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 228-35; Voting Rights, supra note 1, at 625-28;
Shareholder Disempowerment, supra note 1, at 1749-51.
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Shareholders get to vote only in a very limited number of other
circumstances. They get to vote on amendments to the certificate of in-
corporation, 44 some mergers,45 sales of substantially all assets, 46 and dis-
solutions.47 These are big events that do not occur terribly often. More
importantly, shareholders get to vote on these matters only if the board has
first approved the decision. Shareholders in the United States have no right
to initiate any of these actions.48 Thus, the shareholder voting power,
outside of board elections, consists only of ratifying board decisions on a few
big-ticket items.
The one area where American shareholders do have some ability to
initiate action without prior board approval is in enacting bylaws. It is
disputed how extensive this bylaw power is.4 9 Bainbridge has not devoted a
lot of attention to the matter, although in limited comments he, predictably,
opposes an expansive interpretation of the shareholder bylaw power.50 Here,
I expect that he may prove to be somewhat mistaken about the law, which I
believe gives shareholders power to decide a fairly broad range of corporate
governance matters.51 However, the scope of the bylaw power remains, for
now, subject to much uncertainty. The very paucity of such cases shows that
so far shareholders have not extensively mobilized to test their power under
the bylaws. This may be changing, but for the moment the bylaw power still
remains a-rather, the-limited exception to the general story of limited
shareholder power, with virtually no power to initiate corporate actions.52
The Delaware Supreme Court recently decided an important case in this
44DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b) (2001).
45Id. § 251 (c).
4Id. § 271(a).
47Id. § 275(a).
"See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 109 (2001). This is not true in some other countries.
See infra notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
49See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., The Bylaw Battlefield: Can Institutions Change the
Outcome of Corporate Control Contests?, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 605 (1997) (arguing for a more
expansive understanding of the scope of the bylaw power); Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Corporate
Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted By-Laws: Taking Back the Street?, 73 TUL. L. REv. 409
(1998) (arguing for a restricted understanding of the scope of the bylaw power); Brett H.
McDonnell, Shareholder Bylaws, Shareholder Nominations, and Poison Pills, 3 BERKELEY Bus.
L.J. 205 (2005) (arguing for an expansive, but not unlimited, bylaw power).
5 0See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 2, at 46-48. In his new book, Bainbridge reviews the state
of the bylaw debate. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 214-19. At that point, however, he does not
really take a normative position. Later, in chapter five, he takes a general position against attempts
to expand shareholder power, but does not specifically refer back to the bylaw debate. Id. at 228-35.
SlSee McDonnell, supra note 49.
52This statement holds for American corporations. As we shall see, in the U.X shareholders
have a moderately more expansive power. See notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 34
PROFFSSOR BANBRlDGE AND THE ARROWIAN MOMENT
area.53 The shareholders lost, but the reasoning underlying the decision is
rather slippery and it is not yet clear what it will mean for other shareholder
bylaws. Indeed, the case would seem to allow shareholders to craft bylaws
with fairly expansive powers so long as they include fiduciary-out clauses.5 4
Thus, I do not disagree much with Bainbridge's descriptive claim that
shareholders have very little power-most corporate decision-making power
is indeed vested in the board. Bainbridge celebrates and defends that fact.
The normative claim is my target here. Bainbridge's normative defense of
board authority is the leading academic defense available for the basic
contours of American corporate law. The two leading academic alternatives
to Bainbridge-contractarianism and shareholder primacy--do not explain
American corporate law as well.
The contractarian law and economics tradition of scholars such as
Roberta Romano 55 and Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fische 56 do explain
and defend much of corporate law. As I have noted elsewhere, however,
that tradition does not do a great job of explaining why board authority is so
hardwired into our corporate law. 7 It is relatively easy to explain why board
authority should be the default rule for most parts of the law. It is harder to
explain, however, why the law makes it so hard to opt out of the pre-
sumption favoring board authority. That is, why are corporate law's altering
rules, which dictate what is required to opt out of a particular default, so
sticky in support of board authority? As Bainbridge puts it, "Corporation
law virtually carves the separation of ownership and control into stone. 58
Examples of this stickiness include limits on the scope of bylaws, the
requirement of board approval of certificate amendments (which is not true
in many other countries), the rules allowing boards to block hostile
takeovers, rules restricting shareholder agreements that limit board power,
and the independent significance doctrine as applied in a range of Delaware
cases involving preferred shareholder rights. The standard contractarian
position would seem to argue in favor of making opting out of board
authority easier than is observed.
The other leading academic alternative to Bainbridge that argues for
strengthened shareholder power, is led by the copious writing of Lucian
53CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008).
541 discuss this case somewhat further in Brett H. McDonnell, Bylaw Reforms for
Delaware's Corporation Law, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 651, 662-64 (2008).
55ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993).
56EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 36.
57See Brett H. McDonnell, Sticky Defaults and Altering Rules in Corporate Law, 60 SMU
L. REv. 383, 422 (2007).
58BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 4.
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Bebchuk.59 This literature quite explicitly criticizes important parts of state
corporate law, especially Delaware's corporation statute, as vesting too much
power in boards. It does not even attempt to defend the status quo.
A simple graph may help illustrate the relationship between the
leading scholarly positions and Delaware law, as currently interpreted by
Delaware courts. Consider two dimensions of corporate law. The first
dimension is the split of power between shareholders and the board under
the basic default rules of the law. In Figure 1, this split is displayed on the
horizontal axis. A move to the right represents giving more authority to the
board; a move to the left gives more authority to the shareholders. 6° The
second dimension is the stickiness of those default rules in allocating power.
In Figure 1, stickiness is displayed on the vertical axis. Stickiness can vary
from an extreme Teflon rule at the bottom of the graph, to a mandatory rule
at the top.
59See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Casefor Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV.
L. REv. 833, 865-75 (2005) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Increasing Shareholder Power]; Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS. LAW. 43, 64-66 (2003)
[hereinafter Bebchuk, Shareholder Access].
60Of course, the division of power is more complicated than a simple one-dimensional line
can convey. Consider two complications. First, other groups besides the board and shareholders
may get some degree of decision-making power. One could add new dimensions to convey that, but
we need not add that hard-to-picture wrinde for our purposes here. Second, what matters is not
simply the total amount of power granted to the board or shareholders, but how that power is granted
for various specific matters.
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Mandatory
Stickiness * Bebchuk
Delaware o o Bainbridge
...... Contractarians
Teflon
Shareholders Board
Division of Power
Figure 1. Power and Stickiness in Corporate Law
Figure 1 displays the relative position along these two dimensions of
Delaware law and three leading academic positions: contractarianism,
Bebchuk, and Bainbridge. Delaware is far to the right in Figure 1,
representing the fact that the board receives most power and shareholders
receive very little. On the vertical axis, the stickiness dimension, Delaware
is closer to the bottom than the top-this reflects the well-known,
nonmandatory nature of most Delaware law. On the other hand, Delaware is
not completely down at the bottom of the graph by any means-this reflects
the significant degree of stickiness surrounding the grant of board authority
discussed above.
The contractarian position appears as a line in Figure 1. This line is
near the bottom, reflecting the contention that corporate law's default rules
should be easy to alter. This seems to be a core contention of all serious
contractarians. Contractarians differ among themselves, though, as to how
strongly the default rules should favor the board over shareholders. Some,
such as Easterbrook and Fischel, favor giving some real power to
shareholders (particularly in the area of hostile takeovers), while others,
6 1See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 36, at 171.
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such as Romano, approve of the extreme grant of board power that we
observe in Delaware.62
Bebchuk appears in a different part of Figure 1. He is well to the left
of Delaware and most of the contractarians, reflecting his preference for
giving more power to shareholders. He is also more towards the top,
reflecting some preference for less sticky law. That point is more compli-
cated than a simple graph can convey. In some areas, Bebchuk would
protect shareholder power with mandatory rules that are harder to alter than
current law. In other areas, though, Bebchuk argues that a proshareholder
position would actually lead to a default position that is easier to alter than a
proboard default, and he defends the proshareholder defaults on that
63ground. On balance, though, it seems fair to portray Bebchuk as favoring
stickier law than we see in Delaware.
Finally, there is Bainbridge. His point in Figure 1 is much closer to
Delaware than the contractarians or Bebchuk. On the stickiness dimension,
his position seems to fit Delaware law well. On the power dimension, I
would place Bainbridge somewhat to the right of Delaware, representing an
even more extreme proboard allocation of power, but not that much further
right. His main difference from Delaware is on the question of the bylaw
power, as discussed above.64 It could ultimately be, however, that Delaware
will decide the bylaw question in a way that will make its position coincide
with Bainbridge's.
I thus take Bainbridge as the leading academic normative defense for
American state, especially Delaware, corporate law. This makes detailed
exploration of his defense quite interesting-if his argument does not hold
up to that exploration, we are not left with much in the way of a well-
worked-out defense for our corporate law. 65 So, how does Bainbridge
defend the broad grant of authority to boards in American corporate law?
62ROMANO, supra note 55, at 149-50.63See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Optimal Defaults for Corporate Law
Evolution, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 489, 502-06 (2002).
64See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
65The next most influential defense of board authority in the current academic literature is
probably the team production theory of Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout. See generally Margaret M.
Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REv. 247 (1999)
(analyzing the team production theory). They are not my target here. I would rank them as
somewhat less important and influential than Bainbridge for two reasons. First, they are somewhat
heterodox within the ranks of American law because they do not defend the norm of shareholder
wealth maximization. Being heterodox does not make them wrong-indeed, I agree with them on
that point-it just makes them more of a minority and dissident position than Bainbridge. Second,
to date Blair and Stout have not explored the full range of major corporate law doctrines through the
lens of their theory as thoroughly as Bainbridge has done with his. In his new book, Bainbridge
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He begins with the nexus of contracts model that dominates law and
economics corporate law scholarship. According to that model, the corpora-
tion is a legal fiction for a complex web of voluntary, often long-term
relationships among the various constituent groups involved-shareholders,
managers, creditors, employees, customers, suppliers, and the like.66 The
firm provides a useful way of coordinating these complicated relationships.
Corporate law provides hopefully efficient off-the-rack default rules that
mimic the rules that the parties in most corporations would choose, saving
the transaction costs that would be involved in writing those contracts from
scratch for every corporation.67
Many of these contracts, however, are necessarily wildly incomplete.
The parties are often involved in a corporation over a long period. In this
time they will inevitably face a host of situations that the parties could not
feasibly have anticipated and provided for in advance. The question then
arises: who will make decisions as to what to do when an uncontracted-for
event occurs?
68
At this point, Bainbridge draws heavily upon Ronald Coase's
influential theory of the firm.69 For Coase, the defining characteristic of a
firm is the existence of an authoritative decision maker who has fiat power to
choose what to do.70 Actions will be done within a firm where the costs
associated with such an authoritative decision maker are less than the costs
of market bargaining and price setting to determine what to do. As
Bainbridge puts it, it is not that the firm is a nexus, rather, the firm has a
nexus.
71
The fiat decision maker, however, need not be a single person.
Indeed, in a large corporation, it is not a single person. Rather, there is a
takes on the team production theory's rejection of the shareholder wealth maximization norm.
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 60-65.
6'BAINBRDGE, supra note 2, at 27-28; BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 28-30; Abstention
Doctrine, supra note 1, at 104; Primacy in Takeovers, supra note 1, at 799; Director Primacy,
supra note 1, at 552-53; Unocal at 20, supra note 1, at 776. The classical source of the nexus of
contracts view is Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). The leading
development of the nexus idea within corporate law scholarship is EASTERBROOK & FISCHEI, supra
note 36.
67See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 30-3 1; EASTERBROOK & FIsCHEI, supra note 36, at 15.6 8BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 45; OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 79-80 (1985);
Director Primacy, supra note 1, at 555-56.
69R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).70 d. at 403-05. See also BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 38-40 (discussing the work of R.H.
Coase).
71BAINBRIDGE, supra note 2, at 200-01; BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 38; Primacy in
Takeovers, supra note 1, at 799; Director Primacy, supra note 1, at 554.
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hierarchy of decision makers. Moreover, at the top of that hierarchy is a
group (the board), not an individual. In smaller businesses, all or some of
the employees or owners may make decisions collectively. Thus, even given
decision making by an authoritative person or body ex post, as opposed to
contractually-agreed-upon actions ex ante, one must still explain who makes
which decisions and why.
Here, Bainbridge turns to Arrow. Arrow distinguishes two basic
kinds of decision-making structures: "consensus" and "authority. 72 Under
consensus, all members of a relevant team agree on what they should do.
73
Under authority, a central agency receives information from team members,
decides what to do, and then tells the team members what to do.74
Consensus works where all team members have identical interests and
identical information. In that case, they need not spend costly time arguing
over what to do--everyone will reach the same decision without argument.
Alas, a move away from identity of either interests or information gums up
the works.75 If different members have different goals, then even with the
same information they may not agree as to what they should do. Imagine a
group of persons building a house. Even if they all have the same
information as to the relevant materials, costs, and the like, they may
disagree on what to do if one cares mainly about building an energy-efficient
house, another cares mainly about building a dramatically beautiful house, a
third focuses mainly on keeping costs down, and so on. More subtly, even if
everyone shares exactly the same interests, they may have difficulty agreeing
if they have very different information. Among our housebuilders, if some
think that wood is more energy efficient, while others believe that aluminum
siding is more energy efficient, then even if they all agree on energy
efficiency as a goal they may spend much valuable time arguing over wood
versus aluminum. The further we move from either identical interests or
identical information, the more costly consensus becomes.
In a large corporation, no major constituency group comes close to
achieving identical interests or identical information. Shareholders come
72ARROW, supra note 9, at 63-79.731d. at 69-70; see also BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 37 ("Consensus requires that each
member of the organization have identical information and interests so that preferences can be
aggregated at low cost.").74ARROW, supra note 9, at 69-70; see BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 37 ("[A]uthority-based
decision-making structures arise where group members have different interests and information.").
75See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 2, at 201-03; BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 40-44;
Abstention Doctrine, supra note 1, at 106; Voting Rights, supra note 1, at 605-07; Primacy in
Takeovers, supra note 1, at 799-80; Shareholder Disempowerment, supra note 1, at 1745-46;
Director Primacy, supra note 1, at 557-58; Unocal at 20, supra note 1, at 782-84; Executive
Compensation, supra note 1, at 1652-53.
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closest.76 They can largely agree to focus on their financial interests in the
business. Even so, they may have different time horizons or be in different
tax brackets. The growth of equity derivatives further separates the interests
of shareholders." Shareholders are more fundamentally divided by the
information they have. Most shareholders have little stake in any one
corporation, and are thus rationally apathetic-they have little incentive to
gather the information needed to make a good decision on most matters.
Getting the thousands of shareholders in a public corporation to agree on
every operating decision is an obviously Herculean and pointless task. The
task is even more desperate for the other major corporate constituencies. 7
This suggests a need for centralized decision making. In a large
corporation, however, bounded rationality clearly makes it impossible for
one person to make all decisions. This leads to a branching hierarchy.79 The
top of the hierarchy makes high-level decisions and delegates implemen-
tation of those decisions to the next level down, while monitoring its
performance. The next level of managers, in turn, delegates a series of small
decisions to yet lower-level managers, and monitors them. And so on.
Several questions arise at this point: which constituency group or
groups should choose the top decision maker(s)? Why is the top authority in
corporations a group rather than an individual? And, what is the proper
relationship between the constituency which chooses the top decision
makers, namely shareholders, and those decision makers, namely the board
of directors?
On the first question, Bainbridge first argues that only one constit-
uency group should choose the top decision makers; having more than one
group choose (as in German codetermination) would lead to overly wide
divergences in interests and information, thus causing great problems under
Arrow's theory. 0 This answer could use greater exposure to experiences
with codetermination-Bainbridge too quickly accepts the common story
76BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 50-51; Voting Rights, supra note 1, at 606-16; Director
Primacy, supra note 1, at 557-58.
77See Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden
(Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REv. 811,836-39 (2006) (explaining how equity derivatives
can be used to alter voting rights); Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U.
ILL. L. REV. 755 (explaining that financial derivatives and other financial techniques alter
shareholder interests).
78BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 55-57.79BAINBRIDGE, supra note 2, at 232-33; BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 42; Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Participatory Management. An Organizational Failures Analysis,
23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 979, 1004-07 (1998); see generally Roy Radner, Hierarchy: The Economics of
Managing, 30 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1382 (1992) (discussing hierarchy systems in modern firms).
'
0BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 45-49.
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that codetermination results in inefficient conflict. Be that as it may, having
decided that just one group should choose the top decision makers,
Bainbridge argues that the group doing the choosing should be shareholders.
That is both because they have less internally divergent interests and
information than other groups, and also because they are the residual
claimants.8'
That brings us to the next question: why do we find a group (the
board) rather than one person (the CEO) at the top of the hierarchy in the
corporate form? One possible answer to this is that we do not, really-the
CEO is the true source of real power in public corporations. The CEO
effectively controls who will be on the board, and thus dominates the
business. This managerialist theory was once the dominant understanding of
the American corporation, and many still believe that it describes large
American businesses. Bainbridge, however, does not accept this description.
He believes that in recent decades a variety of changes have empowered
boards enough that they do indeed exercise independent authority over the
corporation. Bainbridge devotes chapter four to making this point.82
Accepting for now that Bainbridge is right on that point, why might it
be a good thing? Bainbridge devotes chapter two of The New Corporate
Governance to that question. He spends many pages discussing empirical
literature on when group decision making is likely to be better than
individual decision making.83 Ultimately, he argues that the board is an
effective monitoring device.84 Managers at each level of the hierarchy
monitor those in the level below. But, at the very top, who will monitor the
monitor? That is the board's job. The question, of course, then repeats
itself-who will monitor the board? Part of Bainbridge's answer is that
directors will monitor each other.85 A board is a small, close-knit group of
persons that interacts with each other over many years. This allows them to
closely observe each others' behavior, to evolve norms of hard work, and to
monitor whether their colleagues are abiding by those norms.
8 Id. at 50-57.82See id. at 155-200 (discussing the recent change in the board of directors' role in a
corporation). I shall deal with a few aspects of this chapter below. See also BAINBRIDGE, supra
note 2, at 205-06; Director Primacy, supra note 1, at 561-63. For a critique of director prinacy that
strongly contests this point, see George W. Dent, Jr., Academics in Wonderland: The Team
Production and Director Primacy Models of Corporate Governance, 44 Hous. L. REv. 1213,
1240-44 (2008).83See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 78-104.
84BAINBRIDGE, supra note 2, at 210-13; BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 100-04; Nexus,
supra note 1, at 25-29; Director Primacy, supra note 1, at 567-74.
85BAINBRIDGE, supra note 2, at 211-13; BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 100-04; Nexus,
supra note 1, at 25-29. We shall see that Bainbridge has other answers as well.
[Vol. 34
PROFESsoR BANBRDmGE AND THE ARROWIAN MoMr
This is an interesting and valuable discussion. There is, however, an
odd gap in the argument. Nowhere in chapter two does Bainbridge harken
back to his discussion of Arrow on the benefits of consensus versus
authority, even though this would seem to be highly relevant to the
discussion at this point. There seems to be at least some significant tension
between the argument in chapter two and Arrow's point. After all, modem
monitoring boards contain mostly outside directors, but they still have at
least one insider, the CEO, who in American corporations is still usually the
chair of the board. If the outsiders are focused on monitoring both
themselves and the insiders, this will create significant conflicts of interest
within the board. Bainbridge briefly confronts this problem in chapter four,
which describes and defends the rise of the board-as-monitor model. There,
he says that Arrow's arguments on consensus, as applied to the board,
suggest that consensus should work better in an insider-dominated board.86
He then quickly suggests that countervailing considerations suggest benefits
to outsider-dominated boards.87 I think he needs to do more work on this
point. Arrow's argument on consensus versus authority is central enough to
Bainbridge's core argument that he needs to do a better job of reconciling
Arrow with his story of the internal dynamics of modem boards.
Bainbridge is no fool-he is well aware that director self-monitoring
is far from a complete solution to the agency problem. Both top managers
and the board of a large public corporation have control over a vast amount
of wealth and resources. The temptation to divert some of this to their own
pockets is quite strong. What stops them from doing so? How the law may
help reduce this agency problem has of course been a central focus of
corporate law scholarship at least since the days of Berle and Means.88 This
brings us to our third question: what should be the relationship between
shareholders and the board?
Part of Bainbridge's answer to this question is that effective regulation
of corporations is not only about managing the agency problem. Efficiently
structuring decision-making authority to allow for a good, cheap flow of
information and decisions is also critical. 89 Bainbridge, however, does
acknowledge the importance of the agency problem as well.90 Thus, there
are two core values which both matter to corporate law: authority and
86BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 189.
71d. at 189-90.
8 ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 127-287 (1932).
"Director Primacy, supra note 1, at 572.
"Id. at 573.
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accountability. Bainbridge borrows heavily from Michael Dooley on the
trade-off between authority and responsibility.91 Both Bainbridge and
Dooley harken explicitly to Arrow in describing and understanding this
trade-off. Each piece in the director primacy series contains at least one
statement along the following lines:
On the one hand, directors must be held accountable for
violating their obligation to maximize shareholder wealth.
On the other hand, the substantial virtues of fiat can be
ensured only by preserving the board's decision-making
authority from being trumped by either shareholders or
courts. Resolving that tension turns out to be the chief
problem of corporate governance.
92
This is Bainbridge's core, and best, insight.
The question then becomes: how does and how should the law
establish the proper mix of authority and accountability? For Bainbridge,
the answer will be that at virtually every contested point, the law does and
should side with authority over accountability. We shall explore how
Bainbridge gets to that answer, and whether he provides an adequate
justification for it.
11. THE MOMENT AND THE PUZZLE
This brings us to the central conceptual move in Bainbridge's work:
the Arrowian moment. The moment is present at least once in virtually
every piece in the director primacy series.93
Let us see how the moment evolves. Chapter one develops the
argument described in the last part of the previous section,94 giving good
91See generally Dooley, supra note 10 (analyzing two models of corporate governance: the
authority model and the responsibility model).92BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 75. For similar statements in Bainbridge's director primacy
series, see BAINBRIDGE, supra note 2, at 207, 253; BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 113; Abstention
Doctrine, supra note 1, at 109; Voting Rights, supra note 1, at 626; Primacy in Takeovers, supra
note 1, at 806; Shareholder Disempowerment, supra note 1, at 1747; Director Primacy, supra note
1, at 573; Unocal at 20, supra note 1, at 786; Executive Compensation, supra note 1, at 1653.93BAINBRIDGE, supra note 2, at 207, 253, 517; BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 113, 133,
235; Abstention Doctrine, supra note 1, at 108; Voting Rights, supra note 1, at 626; Primacy in
Takeovers, supra note 1, at 806; Shareholder Disempowerment, supra note 1, at 1747; Director
Primacy, supra note 1, at 573; Much Ado, supra note 1, at 367; Unocal at 20, supra note 1, at 786;
Executive Compensation, supra note 1, at 1650, 1653-54.
94See supra notes 66-81 and accompanying text.
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reasons why in a large corporation most decisions, most of the time, will be
made within a branching hierarchy. Chapter two then gives the arguments
for why a group, the board, sits at the top of that hierarchy. Bainbridge,
however, cannot stop there. He has at least two problems he must attend to.
First, as we have just seen, the vesting of power in the board creates an
accountability problem, and self-monitoring alone seems like a pretty thin
answer to that problem. What more, if anything, can and should be done to
make boards accountable to shareholders? Second, he must explain the
stickiness of the rules favoring board authority. Even if shareholders will
normally want board authority for the reasons developed in chapters one and
two, why not make it easy for them to limit that authority in the name of
greater accountability where the shareholders of a particular corporation so
choose? The arguments in chapters one and two do not give adequate
answers to those questions.
In The New Corporate Governance, Bainbridge repeats his core
answer to these questions in the chapter on director primacy in the courts.
95
Why not give either courts or shareholders more power to review or overturn
board decisions? Bainbridge argues that doing so would overturn the basic
grant of authority to the board to make most decisions. He quotes the
following text from Arrow (this text is the key sign that Bainbridge has
reached the Arrowian moment): "If every decision of A is to be reviewed by
B, then all we have really is a shift in the locus of authority from A to B and
hence no solution to the original problem. "
96
Bainbridge goes on to quote Chancellor Allen: "'To recognize in
courts a residual power to review the substance of business decisions for
"fairness" or "reasonableness" or "rationality" where those decisions are
made by truly disinterested directors in good faith and with appropriate care
is to make of courts super-directors.' 97 Bainbridge says that the theory of
the firm must balance authority and accountability. Alas, "they are ulti-
mately antithetical: one cannot have more of one without also having less of
the other.
9 8
So far, though, this simply says that there is a trade-off between
authority and accountability. That seems unquestionably true. It is not
always true-from some bad starting points, of truly inefficient law, it might
95See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 105-53.
96M. at 113 (quoting ARROW, supra note 9, at 78). For other Bainbridge citations to this
quote in the director primacy series, see supra note 93.97BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 113 (quoting In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. S'holders Litig., No.
10,389, 1989 WL 7036, at *13 n.13 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989), reprinted in 14 DEL. J. CORP. L.
1132, 1156 n.13 (1989)).981d
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be possible to achieve more of both. At some point, however, we will need
to choose between the two.
Authority
Accountability
Figure 2. The Authority/Accountability Trade-off
One can visualize this as an efficiency frontier curve as illustrated by
Figure 2. On one axis is accountability and on the other is authority. From
an inferior point such as A, it is possible to move to a point like B on the
efficiency frontier that features more of both accountability and authority.
For an example of a point A-type law, consider a mandatory disclosure rule
that requires extensive disclosure of some minute detail that no sane
shareholder would ever care about. Mandating this disclosure reduces board
authority (at least over the decision whether or not to disclose that
information) but does nothing to increase accountability, since shareholders
do not care about that information. Eliminating this mandatory disclosure
rule would increase authority without decreasing accountability. In a
political and legal system that works tolerably well, one would not expect to
find too many rules that are blatantly and uncontroversially inefficient in this
way. Once one is on the frontier, at a point like B, however, one must
choose. One can move from B to C and gain more accountability, but at the
cost of impairing authority; or one can move from B to E and gain more
authority, but at the cost of losing accountability."
"Another possibility is that there are points like F that lie beyond the efficiency frontier-
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To say that a trade-off between authority and accountability exists at
some point should be uncontroversial, though it remains valuable to stress
that there is such a trade-off. The hard question is to argue where on the
efficiency frontier the law should be. Given our current starting point
(presuming we are on the efficiency frontier), should we move to more
accountability and less authority, move to more authority and less
accountability, or stay where we are? Having made the arguments we have
reviewed so far, and having recognized the trade-off, here is Bainbridge's
conclusion: "Given the significant virtues of discretion, however, one must
not lightly interfere with management or the board's decision-making
authority in the name of accountability. There ought to be a rebuttable
presumption in favor of preservation of managerial discretion."' 00
But, does the argument preceding this sentence justify that
conclusion? Bainbridge has indeed shown the value of authority. He has
done so with more detail and vigor than most corporate law scholars. Very
few, however, would deny that authority has great value in the context of a
large corporation. Bainbridge has also argued persuasively that there is a
trade-off between authority and accountability--choosing more account-
ability will impair the board's authority. Very few would deny that either.
But, accountability has value, too-Bainbridge does not deny this, although
he dwells on it less than most corporate law scholars.
The key dilemma is figuring where on the efficiency frontier, in
Figure 2, we reach an optimal trade-off between authority and account-
ability. Saying that authority has value, and that more accountability implies
less authority, does not answer the question in favor of authority-it simply
restates the fact that we face a trade-off. Yet, Bainbridge moves almost
immediately from stating that we face a trade-off to stating that in making
this trade-off we should always presume an answer in favor of authority over
accountability.
i.e., they provide more accountability without sacrificing authority as compared with some points on
the frontier, and yet they are not currently feasible. This might be because technology currently
limits our available alternatives, but future innovations will make possible more efficient new rules.
One promising place to look for such changes today is the internet, which is drastically lowering the
costs of gathering information and engaging in certain forms of collective action.
"mBAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 113. For other references to the "presumption" idea, see
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 130, 132, 235; Voting Rights, supra note 1, at 628; Shareholder
Disempowerment, supra note 1, at 1751; Much Ado, supra note 1, at 367; Unocal at 20, supra note
1, at 787. In early articles in his series, Bainbridge expresses the same idea in terms of a "null
hypothesis" in favor of board authority. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 2, at 208, 253, 517;
Abstention Doctrine, supra note 1, at 109; Primacy in Takeovers, supra note 1, at 807; Director
Primacy, supra note 1, at 573.
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IV. DEFENSES OF THE PRIORITY OF AUTHORITY
Does anything in Bainbridge's argument justify this final step? I shall
ultimately answer "no." In this section, I shall consider a variety of Bain-
bridge's arguments that might help him get to his conclusion. The most dis-
tinctive of these is the Arrowian moment itself, and I shall consider it first.
Bainbridge also uses a variety of other arguments that are more standard and
widespread in corporate law scholarship. I look at each in turn, and question
whether each explains why we should maintain a null hypothesis or a pre-
sumption in favor of preserving the board's power of fiat.10'
A. The Arrowian Moment
The central and most distinctive argument in Bainbridge's work for the
priority of authority over accountability is the Arrowian moment itself.
How, though, can Bainbridge use Arrow to move beyond recognizing an
authority/accountability trade-off to telling us something about how we
should make that trade-off? I think that what Bainbridge does here is
implicitly exaggerate the proaccountability positions he opposes.,0 2 Once
one sees this, Bainbridge's use of Arrow falls short of demonstrating what
Bainbridge thinks it demonstrates.
Recall Arrow's point: "If every decision of A is to be reviewed by B,
then all we have really is a shift in the locus of authority from A to B and
hence no solution to the original problem."'
03
Bainbridge immediately follows with this: "'To recognize in courts a
residual power to review the substance of business decisions for "fairness" or
"reasonableness" or "rationality" where those decisions are made by truly
disinterested directors in good faith and with appropriate care is to make of
courts super-directors.
'1°4
In a sense, this is uncontroversial. It merely says that in Figure 2, one
can reach a point like D where we find an extreme of high accountability
with absolutely no authority. Clearly that is right-an extensive and
continuous-enough review power does indeed eventually remove all
authority from the person being reviewed.
'
01See supra note 100.
102Although one proposal does come close to fitting his caricature, see infra notes 115-18
and accompanying text.
103ARROW, supra note 9, at 78. For Bainbridge's citations to this quote, see supra note 93.
1'4BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 113 (quoting In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. S'holders Litig., No.
10,389, 1989 WL 7036, at *13 n.13 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989), reprinted in, 14 DEL. J. CORP. L.
1132, 1156 n.13 (1989)).
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But, does that tell us anything about the active controversies that we
face within mainstream corporate law scholarship and policymaking today?
Does anyone out there with even the slightest chance of being taken
seriously argue for an extreme position that would take us to point D?
Bainbridge's use of Arrow here works as a refutation only of persons who
take such an extreme position. And yet, I do not think one can fairly
characterize any proposals out there in those terms.
There are two main reviewing bodies which could undermine the
authority of boards: shareholders and courts. Bainbridge considers the
former in chapter five of The New Corporate Governance,10 5 and the latter
in chapter three. 1°6 I will consider the leading contemporary debates sur-
rounding each, and see whether or not Bainbridge's Arrowian moment scores
crucial points against any proponents in those debates.
First, let us consider the leading types of proposals in play today for
expanded shareholder power in decision making. Bainbridge divides these
into three categories: "the director nomination process; the mechanics of
voting; and expanding the substance of what shareholders may decide by
vote.' ' 07 I shall consider the first two together, and subdivide the third into
two subcategories. Many proposals today would make it easier for share-
holders to nominate and vote for members of the board other than the board-
approved nominees. This may or may not be a good idea. Bainbridge
strongly attacks these sorts of proposals. 108 Even making it much easier for
shareholders to put forward board nominees at annual meetings, however,
would not remove all board authority, not by any stretch of the imagination.
Indeed, a more effective shareholder voice in board elections fits quite
nicely with Arrow's position. Right after the sentence that Bainbridge quotes
in the Arrowian moment, Arrow makes a further point that Bainbridge also
frequently quotes (indeed, these quotes really constitute an alternative
version of the Arrowian moment): "To maintain the value of authority, it
would appear that responsibility must be intermittent." ' 9 Annual board
elections are a paradigmatic example of intermittent responsibility. Making
it easier for shareholders to challenge board nominees would simply
strengthen this intermittent accountability method. Shareholders get to vote
105 d. at 201-35.
'°'Id. at 105-53.
'
0 71d. at 222.
08BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 222-35; see generally Voting Rights, supra note I (arguing
against modifying the existing director primacy-based system of corporate governance).10°ARROW, supra note 9, at 78. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 127, 133, 234;
Abstention Doctrine, supra note 1, at 109; Voting Rights, supra note 1, at 627; Shareholder
Disempowerment, supra note 1, at 1750.
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just once a year, and they only get to vote on keeping or replacing
individuals, not on particular policy matters. Thus, reforms of the board
election mechanism do not even remotely threaten to undermine all board
authority in the way that Bainbridge hints at.
Other current proposals would expand the substance of what share-
holders can vote on. These come in two forms: votes on bylaws and votes
on certificates of incorporation. First, consider proposals for expanded
shareholder decision-making power through shareholder-enacted bylaws.
Reformers have suggested and sometimes pressed for a variety of bylaws,
including bylaws to expand the shareholders' role in electing directors and
bylaws to limit the power of boards to protect against hostile takeovers. '
10
Might shareholder bylaws cause the disintegration of board authority that
Bainbridge fears?
No. The exact scope of the shareholder bylaw power is disputed and
somewhat uncertain. Elsewhere I have examined that question; and,
following John Coffee,"' I argue that bylaws are limited to questions of
procedure and/or corporate governance. 112 Shareholders cannot use bylaws
to make ordinary business decisions. Procedure and corporate governance
give an important and somewhat broad range of scope for shareholder action
through bylaws. That scope, however, remains limited. The exclusion of
bylaw power over ordinary business decisions rather precisely rules out the
sort of plenary grant of authority to shareholders that Bainbridge fears.
Indeed, one can use Bainbridge's own theory as a persuasive justification for
the procedure or corporate governance versus substantive business decision
distinction for distinguishing valid bylaws.
Somewhat surprisingly, Bainbridge has not yet (to my knowledge)
paid close attention to the shareholder bylaw power.1 3 The following
passage, though, seems to capture some of his concern, in this and related
areas:
Shareholder activism necessarily contemplates that institutions
will review management decisions, step in when management
performance falters, and exercise voting control to effect a
10See generally McDonnell, supra note 49.
"See Coffee, Jr., supra note 49.
1 2 See McDonnell, supra note 49.113In The New Corporate Governance, Bainbridge devotes several pages to a description of
the legal issue. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 214-19. In this passage, though, he does not take a
normative position. Later in the chapter he takes a general stance against all attempts to expand
shareholder power. At that point, however, he does not specifically refer back to the bylaw issue.
See id. at 228-35.
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change in policy or personnel. For the reasons identified
above, giving investors this power of review differs little from
giving them the power to make management decisions in the
first place. Even though investors probably would not
micromanage portfolio corporations, vesting them with the
power to review board decisions inevitably shifts some portion
of the board's authority to them. This remains true even if only
major decisions of A are reviewed by B." 14
This is wrong. Corporate governance bylaws and expanded share-
holder power in board elections would shift "some portion" of board
authority to shareholders. But only some portion, not all. A very crucial
distinction remains between shareholders and the board--crucial according
to the logic of Bainbridge and Arrow. The board does not choose to
micromanage every decision within the corporation. However, that is its
choice. The board can, if it wants to, step in to direct any particular decision
that it wants to review. That is not so for shareholders, even if the reform
proposals were to pass. With increased voting power, shareholders can
replace directors who sufficiently anger them. With the bylaw power, they
can also set corporate rules of a certain type, namely those that determine
procedures or corporate governance. Shareholders cannot, however, choose
to intervene on most particular business decisions. That is not their choice-
it lies beyond their legal power to do so, and that will continue to be so even
if shareholders come to much more actively invoke their bylaw powers under
existing law.
Consider one additional type of proposal for expanded shareholder
decision-making power. Lucian Bebchuk has proposed that the United
States emulate other countries and allow shareholders to amend the
certificate of incorporation without board approval. 115 This would extend
shareholder power further than bylaws can go because charter amendments
are not limited to procedural or corporate governance topics in the same way
that bylaws are. The core statutory grant of authority to the board allows the
certificate or articles to restrict that grant, without limitation on the ways in
which the certificate can restrict board authority." 6 I highly doubt that one
would see charter amendments attempting to micromanage ordinary business
decisions in large public corporations. In this case, however, as opposed to
the case of board elections or bylaws, shareholders would, as a matter of law,
141d. at 234. This repeats verbatim a passage in Voting Rights, supra note 1, at 626.
15Bebchuk, Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 59, at 865-69.
116See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr § 8.01(b) (2007).
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have the power to do so. This does seem to bring us closer to the Arrowian
critique of a continuous power of review.
And yet, many advanced countries do allow shareholders to amend
corporate charters without suffering catastrophic collapses of board
authority.1 17 How can that be? Part of the answer to that question may be
that the practical unlikelihood of shareholder action is more important than
Bainbridge recognizes in the above quote. Boards can intervene in any
particular management decision much more easily than thousands of
dispersed shareholders. The practical limits on shareholder action may work
to protect board authority as effectively as legal limits on shareholder
authority to intervene.
In addition, the law in other countries does impose an important legal
limit on the ability of shareholders to intervene through charter amendments.
Other countries impose supermajority requirements, typically two-thirds or
three-quarters, on shareholder charter amendments. 18 This significantly
increases the practical difficulty of shareholder intervention. Look at it this
way: with a dispersed shareholder base, a unanimity requirement on
shareholder charter amendments would be practically identical to forbidding
such amendments entirely. Large supermajority requirements leave some-
what more room for shareholder action, but if the threshold is high enough,
they effectively limit shareholders to the kind of intermittent review that
safely passes the Arrow test. Thus, any jurisdiction that may consider
Bebchuk's proposal for shareholder power to amend charters should
probably follow the practice of other countries and impose a supermajority
requirement for such shareholder votes.
The other class of proposals for greater board accountability focuses
on courts, not shareholders, as the reviewing body. The main judicial review
of board decisions, at least at the state level, comes through the law of
fiduciary duties. Here, there are many ongoing controversies as to whether
current law, especially Delaware law, provides overly lax oversight, overly
strict oversight, or gets it just about right. In chapter three of The New
Corporate Governance, Bainbridge focuses on two key elements of fiduciary
law: the business judgment rule and Delaware's law concerning takeover
defenses.' 9 As to the business judgment rule,120 Bainbridge applies the
'"See Companies Act, 2006, c.46, §§ 21(1), 283 (U.K.); Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock
Corporation Act], § 179, reprinted in GERHARD WiRTH ET AL., CORPORATE LAW IN GERMANY
§ 179, at 377 (2004).
1"Companies Act, 2006, c.46, §§ 21,283 (U.K.) (requiring three-quarters); Aktiengesetz
[AktG] [Stock Corporation Act], § 179, reprinted in GERHARDWIRTH Er AL, CORPORATE LAW IN
GERMANY § 179, at 377 (2004) (requiring three-quarters).
"
9Bainbridge explored these points in earlier articles. See Abstention Doctrine, supra note
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Arrowian moment to argue that giving courts plenary power to review any
sort of board decisions they choose, whenever they choose (more precisely,
whenever a shareholder plaintiff asks them to review), would move one to
point D in Figure 2.
I think that is a very strong point. If someone were to argue for
eliminating the business judgment rule altogether, Bainbridge may have
produced the best argument against doing so. I would be hard pressed to
think, however, of anyone today who is taken at all seriously and is
advocating a radical expansion of fiduciary duty law, such that courts would
be continually second-guessing board decisions in a way that removes all
board authority. The business judgment rule is well entrenched, and while
there are scholars who suggest limiting its scope in some ways, I am aware
of no serious attempt to do away with it completely.
Moreover, Bainbridge does not deny that some board decisions should
receive judicial scrutiny. The key question then becomes: what sorts of
board decisions should courts review? Traditionally courts have given
heightened scrutiny to transactions where directors or officers have a
material conflict of interest, and Bainbridge agrees with that. The main
debate today occurs over whether any sort of heightened scrutiny should
apply in situations beyond the traditional sorts of conflicts of interest. I
myself have advocated using the idea of good faith to modestly increase
judicial oversight of types of decisions where structural bias is a systematic
problem. 121 Bainbridge opposes the expanded use of good faith, including a
relatively rare disagreement with the Delaware courts. 22 Arrow will not
help decide between Bainbridge's position and mine. Neither of us argues
for a judicial power of plenary review. We both agree that strict judicial
review should be limited to types of decisions that raise structural concerns
about board impartiality. We just disagree about where to draw the line.
Note that the situation here is the same as with the proposals for expanded
shareholder power. Bainbridge's use of Arrow does a great job at explaining
the limits of current debates. It does not help defend Bainbridge's particular
preferred points within those debates.
It also bears noting that Bainbridge's strong defense of the business
judgment rule in chapter 3 is in some tension with parts of his argument in
1; Unocal at 20, supra note 1.
1201 briefly consider Bainbridge on the takeover case law below, see infra note 145-48 and
accompanying text.
'
2 1Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Disney, Good Faith, and Structural Bias, 32 J.
CORP. L. 833, 859-62 (2007) [hereinafter Disney, Good Faith, and Structured Bias]; Claire A. Hill
& Brett H. McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding Duty of Loyalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV.
1769, 1794-95 (2007).122Good Faith, supra note 1, at 584-85.
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chapter four. Chapter four looks at important developments in recent
decades that have moved us from managerialism to board primacy.
Delaware judicial decisions play a large part in that story. 123 These decisions
are not completely irreconcilable with the presumption in favor of
authority-the presumption, after all, is not supposed to be irrebuttable
(though at times it may seem that way). Those who favor a strong business
judgment rule, however, should be uneasy with the developments that
Bainbridge describes in chapter four-Chancellor Allen makes that very
point in a recent article.1 24 Yet, Bainbridge describes these cases in positive
terms, as helping to bring his great idea, director primacy, into being. 25
In sum, the Arrowian moment on its own does not succeed as a
critique of existing proposals for greater accountability through expanded
shareholder power. Arrow does support Bainbridge in arguing that authority
matters and that authority has many good qualities. Arrow also supports
Bainbridge in arguing that ultimately there is a trade-off between authority
and accountability, and policies that go too far in seeking accountability will
undermine authority altogether. This is not enough, however, to criticize
actual proposals today for greater accountability of boards to shareholders.
The battle today is in the middle ground. In this middle ground, Arrow
simply tells us that both authority and accountability have value, and we
should reject policies that completely subordinate one to the other. It may
well be that Bainbridge's theory explains why debate now occurs within this
middle ground (i.e., why serious critics do not advocate proposals that would
completely undermine board authority). That is an important contribution.
It does not help Bainbridge, however, when he goes on to argue for
particular positions within this contested middle ground.
Indeed, if anything, Arrow's argument, properly understood, calls
Bainbridge's own positions into doubt. While Bainbridge does affirm that
accountability matters, when push comes to shove, he virtually always favors
123BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 173-76 (citing Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006);
Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400 (Del. 1987); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346
(Del. 1985); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805
(Del. 1984); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492
(Del. Ch. 2003); In re Caremark Intl Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996); Puma v.
Marriott, 283 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 1971)).
'
24William T. Allen, Modem Corporate Governance and the Erosion of the Business
Judgment Rule in Delaware Corporate Law 16 (Comparative Research in Law & Political
Economy, Paper No. 06/2008), available at http:/www.ssm.com/abstract=l 105591.
1251 shall return later to the tension between chapter 4 and the rest of the book, see infra
notes 190-92 and accompanying text. I have already discussed an instance of this. See supra notes
85-87 and accompanying text.
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authority. He thus risks moving to a position like point E,126 where one
maximizes authority but loses all accountability. Point E is no more in
keeping with Arrow than point D. One page after the sentences that Bain-
bridge so loves to quote, in the very final paragraph of his wonderful book,
Arrow says, "[T]he unthinking acceptance of authority based on echoes from
religion and kingship is, I believe, gone."1 27 I have not seen Professor
Bainbridge quote that one.
128
B. Board Dynamics
At one point early in The New Corporate Governance, Bainbridge
seems to acknowledge, to a degree, the limitation of his core argument. He
writes that "[t]o say that such proposals would shift authority from directors
to shareholders is more of a description than an argument. '" 129 Bainbridge
also says that he "acknowledge[s] that the argument to this point rarely will
prove dispositive."130 How does he reply to this? In part, he rather
unhelpfully asserts that the argument does show enough value to authority to
justify a presumption in its favor, which we have seen is really not so. He
also says, however, that other sorts of arguments will also be needed, and
used in the book, to defend the presumption favoring authority. We must
now, then, turn to those other arguments.
Scattered through The New Corporate Governance and the director
primacy articles are a variety of other arguments for privileging authority
over accountability. These arguments are far less distinctively Bainbridgean
than the Arrowian moment. He draws on standard law and economics
arguments that many corporate law scholars before him have used. Still, a
full understanding and critique of his arguments for director primacy
requires consideration of these more standard points. I shall consider the
main points that Bainbridge uses, and respond to each with the standard
replies that many corporate law scholars before me have used. There are a
few twists along the way, though.
126See supra p. 160 fig.2.
127ARROW, supra note 9, at 79.
128It is unfair to covertly imply that Bainbridge's acceptance of authority is unthinking-
that, it is certainly not. However, "echoes from religion and kingship" does, I believe, accurately
capture a real strand of the Burkean Bainbridge. Not that this is a bad thing-I think deep values
other than efficiency should be a greater part of our debate over corporate law. See infra notes 211-
12 and accompanying text.
129BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 12.1301d.
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Perhaps the most distinctive further set of arguments that Bainbridge
focuses on are the dynamics within the board itself. Recall that in chapter
two of The New Corporate Governance, Bainbridge argues that a group,
rather than a person, sits at the top of the corporate hierarchy in good part
because a group is likely to engage in better monitoring of subordinates and
also in self-monitoring. 131 Chapter four describes a variety of developments
in recent decades that have increased the monitoring role of the board. I
particularly like Bainbridge's emphasis on the role of norms in guiding board
behavior.132
On Bainbridge's own account, however, we do not simply leave it to
the directors themselves to develop and enforce their norms as they see fit.
Far from it. A variety of governmental and quasi-governmental institutions
work to help shape those norms. Institutions like the Delaware courts, the
stock exchanges, and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) are
effective in helping shape norms and best practices. This is in part because
they are focal-point actors, so that their articulations of best behavior in
various circumstances will be followed closely by board advisors,
particularly lawyers, and thereby conveyed to the directors themselves.
Moreover, even a small probability of legal liability will help focus the mind.
Relatedly, even where subpar behavior does not ultimately give rise to
liability, it may lead to lengthy cases before final victory for defendants,
victory which would have come much quicker with better behavior. The
Disney case is a good example.
133
Governmental and quasi-governmental actors play a big role in many
of the developments in board behavior that Bainbridge surveys in chapter
four. Delaware courts have helped shape norms and encourage director
independence. 134 Congress and the SEC have pushed for stronger board
independence in Sarbanes-Oxley and the rules implementing it.135 The stock
exchanges have pushed for board independence even more strongly with
their corporate governance rules, 136 and those exchanges are nominally
private entities that the SEC strongly oversees and tends to push in its
preferred directions. 137 Bainbridge also sees modem board compensation
13'See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
132BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 101-04, 163-67.
133ln re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). See also Disney,
Good Faith, and Structural Bias, supra note 121 (discussing the lengthy shareholder suit over
Michael Ovitz's severance package).
134BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 172-76.
13 1d. at 176-77.
1361d. at 177-87.
137Robert B. Thompson, Collaborative Corporate Governance: Listing Standards, State
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practices as encouraging more vigorous boards. Even if one accepts this,138
it is worth pointing out that a major impetus for the move to stock-based
compensation was the Congressional enactment of Internal Revenue Code
section 162(m).' 39
Thus, although internal board dynamics and norms are indeed an
important part of achieving accountability, that does not necessarily mean
that outside regulators should take a hands-off approach and always defer to
board authority. Indeed, Bainbridge's own account shows that achieving
better functioning boards requires outside regulators to step in to encourage
greater accountability.
C. Market Accountability
One common argument is that shareholders require little in the way of
legal accountability mechanisms because they already have effective,
nonlegal, market-based accountability mechanisms. 140 These market
mechanisms include labor markets, product markets, the market for corpo-
rate control, executive compensation contracts, and capital markets. These
mechanisms all provide some accountability. They are also all highly
imperfect. The question is whether individually, or in combination, they
work well enough that little legal intervention is required to protect
shareholders, or if instead, these markets are so deeply imperfect that there is
much room for legal intervention.
Executive labor markets, both internal and external, provide some
limits on managerial misbehavior. 141 Managers who do a good job are more
likely to get promoted internally or hired for higher-paying positions
elsewhere. On the other hand, there are important limits to labor markets. It
is often very hard to disentangle the contributions of individual managers to
firm success, and problems arising from one manager's actions may not
appear until that person has gone on elsewhere. For older managers,
especially CEOs, there is an end game problem-they are tempted to cheat
Law, and Federal Regulation, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 961,976-81 (2003).138A point that some vigorously debate. See infra notes 143-53 and accompanying text.139 1.R.C. § 162(m) (2008). See also BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 1, at72 (discussing the
purpose behind the enactment of I.R.C. § 162(m)).
'4OBainbridge makes elements of these arguments in a variety of places. See BAINBRIDGE,
supra note 2, at 206; BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 55, 112, 123, 151-52, 197-98. See also
Abstention Doctrine, supra note 1, at 122; Primacy in Takeovers, supra note 1, at 806; Shareholder
Disempowerment, supra note 1, at 1737-41; Director Primacy, supra note 1, at 562, 568 n.103.
This argument has a long history in economics-influenced corporate law scholarship. See
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 36, at 4-6; ROMANO, supra note 55, at 14-15.
141See Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON.
288, 292-93 (1980).
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and cash in with their current job because they do not have many years left
in any case, and hence their reputation matters less to them.
142
Product markets impose further constraints on corporate governance.
A poorly run firm will not be able to produce high quality goods or services
at a low price and will find its market share shrinking. Eventually,
bankruptcy may ensue and the managers will lose their jobs. For well-
established companies, however, this is a quite lax constraint-it takes many
years of seriously bad performance to affect the existence of a poorly run
business. 1
43
At least since Henry Manne, those who believe markets do a good job
of constraining managers have frequently pointed to the market for corporate
control. 144 If managers do a bad job, the firm's stock price will decline so
that eventually it will become vulnerable to a hostile takeover. This stops
bad performance in two ways. Most directly, bad performers get removed in
takeovers. More indirectly, the fear of this keeps managers from doing too
bad a job.
The market for corporate control, however, has inherent limits and it
has become increasingly weak in recent years. Hostile takeovers occur only
for companies that underperform quite badly-there is plenty of room to do
a moderately bad job without facing a threat. Worse still, states have
allowed companies to develop a variety of antitakeover defenses that make
genuinely hostile takeovers almost impossible today in most companies. 141
Even where control of an underperforming company does change and bad
managers get removed, at least for the top executives this will happen only if
they have managed to arrange very cushy golden parachutes for themselves.
Thus, the threat of a takeover has lost its sting for those at the top.
146
Interestingly, Bainbridge supports the law in allowing antitakeover defenses
on director primacy grounds. 147 He does not really come to grips, however,
142See Eric Talley, Taking the "I" out of "Team ": Intra-Firm Monitoring and the Content of
Fiduciary Duties, 24 J. CORP. L. 1001, 1029 (1999).
143See Brett H. McDonnell & Daniel A. Farber, Are Efficient Antitrust Rules Always
Optimal?, 48 ANTITRUST BULL. 807, 817 (2003).
144See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON.
110,112 (1965).
145See ROMANO, supra note 55, at 54-57.
146See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of
Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 887 (2002) (discussing the
success of the combination of staggered boards and poison pills in preventing hostile takeovers).
147BAINBRIDGE, supra note 2, at 718-38; BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 136-53; Primacy in
Takeovers, supra note 1, at 807-09; Unocal at 20, supra note 1 (discussing the balance between
boards' discretionary authority and director accountability, and arguing the Delaware Supreme Court
appropriately balanced director authority and accountability by providing a mechanism to evaluate
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with the way this undermines one of the leading market accountability
mechanisms. Or rather, at several points he basically gives up the ghost on
this point and admits that takeovers are not the key disciplinary limit on
corporate managers-instead, he claims, the board is.
148
Properly designed compensation contracts can give managers good
incentives to look after shareholder interests. 149 Poorly designed compen-
sation contracts, however, can divert resources to managers and give them
poor incentives; and, in a poorly run company, the managers often get to set
their own contracts through their domination of the board. There is, of
course, much debate currently over this topic. Bebchuk and Fried have
vigorously argued that managerial power explains much executive compen-
sation in the United States today.150 Bainbridge disputes this. 15' Part of his
argument points to conflicting empirical evidence and theoretical arguments,
and makes the true, but hardly dispositive, point that Bebchuk and Fried's
hypothesis is "often plausible but contestable.' ' 52 Bainbridge has not done
the hard and lengthy work of disentangling the various conflicting theoretical
arguments and empirical evidence153--one must look elsewhere for this.
Bainbridge also argues, in a review of Bebchuk and Fried, that executives
are probably more motivated by self-esteem and reputation than incentive
compensation. 154 Perhaps, but if so then this particular strand in the web of
accountability mechanisms that anti-interventionist scholars generally cite is
of little value.
Informationally efficient capital markets also help constrain managers
on their own and in conjunction with some of the above mechanisms. 155
Firms that do well will have higher stock prices. This makes it easier for
them to raise money and expand. It also makes stock-based compensation
mechanisms work better and underlies the working of the market for corpo-
rate control. Bainbridge simply asserts or assumes the relative efficiency of
directors' abuse of authority).14 8BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 151; Unocal at 20, supra note 1, at 826.
149Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Perfonnance Pay and Top-Management
Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225 (1990) (analyzing the different incentive mechanisms for
improving performance).
'
5
°BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 1, at 61-64.15
'BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 167-70; Executive Compensation, supra note 1, at 1626-
43. 152Executive Compensation, supra note 1, at 1629.
153 0f course, neither have I.154Executive Compensation, supra note 1, at 1632.155See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 152; Larry E. Ribstein, The Mandatory Nature of the
ALI Code, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 984,996 (1993).
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capital markets and never seriously comes to grips with the major challenges
to the efficient capital market hypothesis that have arisen in recent years156
Much more could be said on the hard empirical questions that arise in
assessing how well these various market mechanisms function to maintain
managerial accountability, both individually and in combination with each
other. The empirical evidence is mixed and controversial. Further
exploration, however, is not necessary here because, in truth, Bainbridge
does not put much heart into this line of argument. 57 He occasionally makes
the standard law and economics case for these sorts of market mechanisms,
but in no detail at all. It is really more of a toss-off point for him, not a
central part of his defense of board authority.
D. State Law and the Race to the Top
A common economic argument for the efficiency of Delaware law is
the race-to-the-top thesis.' 58 According to this, corporations have incentives
to offer efficient corporate governance structures because investors will pay
less to invest in companies which are subject to theft by their managers. In
turn, states have an incentive to offer good corporate laws because
shareholders will pay more to invest in companies governed by good laws,
and managers will want to incorporate in good states. In most of his work,
Bainbridge has not actually relied much on this sort of argument. He makes
glancing reference to it at several points in The New Corporate
Governance.159 In a recent reply to Lucian Bebchuk's work on increasing
shareholder power, however, Bainbridge uses this line of argument at some
length in a section refreshingly entitled "Hail Pangloss"'16
But Pangloss has a bad reputation for a reason, and Bainbridge does
not go into this debate in enough detail to shift longstanding battle lines.
Bainbridge points to some empirical evidence in favor of efficient state
competition' 6' but does not confront the counterevidence 62 He assumes
156BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 57; Shareholder Disempowerment, supra note 1, at 1737.
For extensive discussion of challenges to the theory of informationally efficient capital markets and
the rise of the field of behavioral finance, see ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (2000). Dent's critique of director primacy also
emphasizes this point. See Dent, supra note 82, at 1225-26.
157See supra note 140.158See ROMANO, supra note 55, at 14-24; Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder
Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 255-58 (1977).159BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 35-36, 155.
16°Shareholder Disempowerment, supra note 1, at 1736-44. He makes the same assumption
in his new book. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 144-45, 227.6t Shareholder Disempowerment, supra note 1, at 1742-43.
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with little argument that investors in initial public offerings (IPOs) will
accurately price the likely effects of corporate governance mechanisms.
163
There is now much debate, however, over the accuracy of pricing in IPOs in
general, and for this type of feature in particular. In part, this is just an
implication of the broader debate over capital market efficiency. Even if
secondary markets for established companies are relatively efficient,
however, it is far from clear that IPO markets are also efficient-they are
subject to much greater informational problems and there is well-known
evidence that IPO prices are not well behaved.164
Elsewhere I have explored the race-to-the-top debate in much further
detail. 165 I argue for an intermediate position. Competition between states
does provide for experimentation and flexibility. The control of managers
over the incorporation decision, however, also tends to make Delaware law
overly biased in favor of managers. U.S. law partially protects against this
managerial bias through the threat, and occasional reality, of federal
securities law occupation of part of the field in corporate governance. The
world is not all doom, but it is not the best of all possible worlds either. At
any rate, Bainbridge does not advance the ball much in this area, aside from
the wonderfully honest section title.
E. Special Interest Shareholders
In some of his most recent director primacy articles, Bainbridge added
a new argument against expanded shareholder power. 166 This argument is
now a central part of his case in chapter five of The New Corporate
Governance against proposals for greater shareholder power. Throughout
the whole director primacy series, he has been skeptical about the likelihood
of shareholder activism occurring very often because of the standard reasons
related to collective action problems and the ease of shareholder exit (the
"Wall Street rule"). 167 That argument suggests that shareholder activism
162See Lucian Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate
Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775 (2002).
163Shareholder Disempowerment, supra note 1, at 1737.
164Jay R. Ritter, The Long-Run Performance of initial Public Offerings, 46 J. FIN. 3 (1991);
Jay R. Ritter & Ivo Welch, A Review of 1PO Activity, Pricing, and Allocations, 57 J. FIN. 1795
(2002).
165Brett H. McDonnell, Two Cheers for Corporate Law Federalism, 30 J. CORP. L. 99
(2004).
m6See Voting Rights, supra note 1, at 629-35; Shareholder Disempowerment, supra note 1,
at 1751-57.
167See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 2, at 515; BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 202-09; Director
Primacy, supra note 1, at 571-72.
20091
DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW
would not create many benefits, but also that its costs would not be terribly
high.
More recently, though, shareholder activism has become more
common and more effective. Corporate governance proposals now frequent-
ly receive votes in the thirty and forty percent range, and occasionally
pass. 168 In response, Bainbridge now adds a rather different point. The
institutional investors most likely to engage in shareholder activism are
union and public employee pension funds. These investors, though, may be
self-dealing, pursuing the interests of their managers or their beneficiaries
where those interests conflict with those of other shareholders.' 69 Indeed,
there is some empirical evidence, both anecdotal and econometric, that this
happens. 170
But should this concern us as much as it does Bainbridge? It is
certainly of less concern, and indeed a reason to approve of such activism,
for those who, like me, take a stakeholder approach to the question of the
proper goal of the corporation. 171 The nonshareholder constituency with the
strongest claim to a place in the corporate objective function is its
employees. Insofar as union pension funds are trying to advance the
interests of employees, that would be a good thing. Public employee pension
funds, too, may show concern for a corporation's employees. They may also
be interested in a variety of other issues that concern the general public, e.g.,
environmental issues. Of course, those who control such public pension
funds are themselves subject to serious agency problems. So long as they
are ultimately to some degree accountable to a plausible version of the public
interest, however, they should still tend to be a force for the good.
Obviously, the topic of the proper objective function for corporations is
highly debated, and I do not intend to go any further into that debate here.
Even accepting Bainbridge's premise of an objective of maximizing
shareholder value, shareholder activism by union and public employee
pension funds may still be a good thing. Bebchuk argues that union or
public employee fund proposals can succeed only if they receive a majority
168See RISKMETRICS GROUP, 2007 POSTSEASON REPORT: A CLOSER LOOK AT
ACCOUNTABILITY AND ENGAGEMENT 6 (2007), http/www.riskmetrics.comsites/defaultfles/2007
PostSeasonReport Final.pdf (charting the type of shareholder proposals that have gained support in
recent years).
169See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 228-32; Voting Rights, supra note 1, at 634-35 n.88;
Shareholder Disempowerment, supra note 1, at 1754-55.17 0See Ashwini K. Agrawal, Corporate Governance Objectives of Labor Union Share-
holders: Evidence from Proxy Voting (NYU Stem Sch. of Bus. Working Paper Series, Paper No.
08-006, 2008), available at httpJ/papers.ssrn.comso3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1285084.
171See McDonnell, supra note 32 (arguing for employee primacy in corporate governance).
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vote. 172 Thus, they must get nonspecial interest shareholders to agree with
them. Therefore, only proposals that benefit all (nonmanagement) share-
holders are likely to succeed.
Bainbridge has several responses to this counterargument. First, he
argues that risk averse managers may give in to blackmail by fund managers
even if the corporate managers would probably win if the blackmailers
actually brought their proposal to a vote. 173 But managerial risk aversion
may also have good effects. Many value-increasing proposals are probably
unlikely to succeed because of the standard collective action problems.
Managerial risk aversion may cause boards to nonetheless make good, value-
increasing responses to such positive-but-unlikely-to-succeed measures. It is
then a tough empirical question whether managerial risk aversion magnifies
value-decreasing or value-increasing proposals more.
Second, Bainbridge raises the possibility of special interest funds
proposing value-increasing proposals, but then dropping them for private
benefits. 74 This could happen, but it seems a bit of a stretch to think that it
is likely to be a problem of first-order significance. Moreover, even when it
does happen, the initial threat may signal to other potential shareholder
activists the potential for a value-increasing proposal, which they may then
pursue. The net effects of shareholder activism may in such cases still be
positive.
A third response that Bainbridge makes to Bebchuk's argument on the
need for majority approval is that special interest funds may bundle value-
increasing and value-decreasing proposals in order to further the latter.1
75
This, however, seems likely to succeed in getting votes only where the net
effect is value increasing-presumably a good outcome, on balance.
Bainbridge also suggests that pension funds may offer side payments to other
shareholders to ensure passage. 176 But two can play that game-corporate
managers can do the same, using corporate funds. A basic Coasean
argument suggests that the net result of this gaming should be that only
proposals that increase value on balance will succeed.
Furthermore, although Bainbridge is right in that sometimes the
interests of union or public employee pension funds will diverge from the
interests of other shareholders, often their interests will not conflict. Their
172See Bebchuk, Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 59, at 885.
173BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 231; Shareholder Disempowerment, supra note 1, at 1756.
174See supra note 173.
175BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 232; ShareholderDisempowerment, supra note 1, at 1756.
176BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 232; Shareholder Disempowennent, supra note 1, at 1756-
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proposals are more likely to succeed where their interests converge with
those of other shareholders. With the types of shareholder proposals that
currently receive a substantial percentage of shareholder votes (more than,
say, five percent), it certainly appears that there is no good reason to see a
divergence of interests. In the 2007 proxy proposal season, the types of
proposals that were most common and received the highest percentage of
votes were those calling for majority voting, advisory votes on compen-
sation, board declassification, pay for performance, independent board
chairs, and rescinding supermajority requirements. 77 It is hard to paint these
proposals as leaning heavily to special shareholder interests, although the
executive compensation proposals probably have some redistributive
political kick to them.
Indeed, the fact that the managers of union and public employee
pension funds are less constrained to maximize the monetary return to their
beneficiaries than are the managers of other sorts of funds may well serve to
help the interests of shareholders as a group. The free rider problem keeps
other sorts of fund managers from pursuing activist proposals because their
funds will not reap the full benefits of their activism. Union and public fund
managers may be able to avoid this free rider problem precisely because they
are less tied to a goal of maximizing financial return for their beneficiaries.
One agency problem may thus help solve a different agency problem.
Finally, in The New Corporate Governance, Bainbridge has for the
first time (as far as I can determine) addressed the question of a different sort
of shareholder activist. Some hedge funds are now getting more involved in
some types of shareholder activism.17 8 These do not pose the same special
interest concerns as do union and public pension funds-although they may
pose different special interest concerns. Corporate governance scholars will
grapple with the promises and perils posed by this new kind of actor.
Bainbridge begins to do so in the new book. He argues that the evidence to
date suggests that where hedge funds have succeeded in increasing
shareholder value, they have done so by creating or encouraging change in
control transactions, not through corporate governance activism.
79
This conclusion about the empirical effects of hedge fund activism is
convenient for Bainbridge's position, but he jumps to it too quickly. Hedge
fund activism is new, and we are just starting to study and understand it. In
reaching his conclusion, Bainbridge mainly relies on one unpublished
177See RISKMETRICS GROUP, supra note 168, at 6.
178Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1029-37 (2007).
179BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 205-07.
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study.180 Other recent studies, however, suggest that hedge funds are
achieving positive gains through broader forms of activism than Bainbridge
argues for, including activism focused on corporate governance.' 8 1 It will
take time to sort this out, and presumably hedge fund activism will continue
to evolve. My reading of the evidence to date, however, suggests this new
development represents more of a threat to the director primacy model than
Bainbridge allows.
F. The Burkean Argument
Another sort of argument occasionally appears in the director primacy
series, an argument that actually goes back to an older work by Bain-
bridge. 18 2 Bainbridge is a Burkean conservative, and hence he is prone to
make evolutionary, survival-based arguments in favor of the board-centric
status quo. This existing system has been around for a while, and it has
served us well. We should, therefore, be reluctant to change it.
183
There is something to this sort of argument. Large corporations have
long been a central part of the U.S. economy, and that economy has
generated a standard of living never before achieved in human history. One
should be careful before tinkering with this system too radically.
But what precisely is it that has survived for so long and performed so
well? What features are essential, and what can we safely tinker with? Here
is where the Burkean argument falters. At some points, Bainbridge
characterizes the object of his solicitude quite broadly as the separation of
ownership and control. 184 This goes back quite far-at least as far back as
Berle and Means, and Bainbridge argues back even further, to the nineteenth
century origins of American big business. 85 Perhaps so, but the board
primacy model, which Bainbridge defends, does not go back so far.
Although corporate law has put legal authority in the hands of the board for
180Robin Greenwood, The Hedge Fund as Activist, WORKING KNOWLEDGE, Aug. 22,2007,
http://hbswk.hbs.edu/cgi-bin/print?id=5743.18t Nicole M. Boyson & Robert M. Mooradian, Hedge Funds as Shareholder Activists from
1994-2005 (July 31, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=
992739; Alon Brav et al., The Returns to Hedge Fund Activism (European Corp. Governance Inst.
Working Paper Series in Law, Paper No. 098/2008), available at http://www.ssm.com/abstract=
1111778.
182See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian
Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 856 (1997) (book
review).
1 3See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 35.
1841d. at 6-8; Voting Rights, supra note 1, at 619-21.
185BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 7; Voting Rights, supra note 1, at 620-21.
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many decades, one does not have to go terribly far back to find a system
where inside officers, led by the CEO, dominated the corporation, not the
board. This is still the case for many corporations.
Indeed, elsewhere Bainbridge makes this point himself. He is at pains
to distinguish managerialism from board primacy. He admits that once
inside managers dominated U.S. corporations. He argues, however, that in
the last few decades many developments have led to more active oversight
and control by boards. These developments include stock-based compen-
sation, the market for corporate control, more active shareholder litigation,
and stock market rules concerning corporate governance. 186 In The New
Corporate Governance, he devotes a whole chapter to defending this
point.187
One may question whether these measures have yet led to a real
escape from managerialism. Let us, however, concede this point to
Bainbridge. The fact remains that Bainbridge's model of the large public
corporation, as an actual depiction of reality, is at best a recent achievement.
Moreover, that model is constantly evolving. Stock-based compensation
came on strong in the 1980s and 1990s. The market for corporate control
became really important only in the 1970s and 1980s and has since waned.
Shareholder litigation has grown gradually over time. Stock market rules
have come in several waves, some only quite recent. Sarbanes-Oxley is
another recent development that pushes some of these trends further.
Bainbridge thus faces a variant of the problem that plagues American
Burkeans generally. How does one use tradition to defend a social,
economic, and legal system which has as a central, defining feature constant,
sometimes dramatic, change? Board primacy, if indeed it does exist, does so
only because of an ongoing series of reforms that strive to make managers
more accountable to the board. On what principle do we suddenly decide
that enough is enough and cut off that evolution?1
88
The last point suggests further that one can dispute Bainbridge's
characterization of the many changes in recent decades. He sees them as
increasing board authority vis-A-vis managerial authority. One, however, can
also characterize them as movements towards greater accountability and
away from unaccountable authority. As such, they are in real tension with
186Shareholder Disempowerment, supra note 1, at 1741; Director Primacy, supra note 1, at
562-63.
187BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 155-200.
188Dent's critique of director primacy also notes that our system of corporate governance
continues to evolve and seems to be moving away from director primacy. See Dent, supra note 82,
at 1264-73.
[Vol. 34
PROFESSOR BANBRUiDGE AND THE ARROWIAN MOMENT
Bainbridge's presumption in favor of authority over accountability. We have
already seen that Bainbridge acknowledges that the move towards outsider-
dominated boards does not fit well with Arrow's basic account of consensus
and authority. 189 We have also seen that his chapter four account of
Delaware case law does not fit particularly well with his chapter three
defense of the business judgment rule.190 Another instance of the tension
comes in his account of the post-Enron stock exchange corporate governance
rules. In The New Corporate Governance, he paints these rules as pressing
for a stronger board, hence as increasing board primacy, which would appear
to be a good thing for him. 191 Yet, when the rules were first proposed,
Bainbridge critiqued them as contradicted by the empirical evidence and as
part of an undesirable trend of creeping federalization in corporate law.
192
Of course, a scholar always reserves the right to change his mind and doing
so reveals the virtue of open-mindedness. On balance, however, it seems to
me that Bainbridge's original position is more in keeping with his overall
theory. In his new book, Bainbridge does consider at some length the
evidence on independent director performance, which he previously used to
attack the new exchange rules. 193 He admits that the empirical evidence is
mixed and says that a one-size-fits-all rule does not fit all corporations.' 94
Yet, his bottom line conclusion is that the modern trends in board behavior,
including the growth of independent directors, have led to stronger, more
effective boards. 195
One variant of the Burkean argument is that we have recently engaged
in quite a big burst of change-Sarbanes-Oxley, the stock market corporate
governance rules, emerging case law on good faith, and so on. Since these
will have uncertain effects which we are still learning, let us give them time
before moving on to other new big changes. 196 This strikes me as plausible,
albeit not dispositive. But, as always, there are counter-considerations. For
one, it is almost always worthwhile to at least put out decent reform
proposals for discussion. Even if the time is not ripe, practically or
politically, for their adoption, they will then be out there when the next
18gSee supra notes 86-87.
199See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
191BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 177-87.
192Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Critique of the NYSE's Director Independence Listing
Standards (UCLA Sch. of Law Research Paper Series, Paper No. 02-15, 2002), available at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=317121.
193BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 187-98.
'
941d. at 197-98.
'
951d. at 198-200.
196See Voting Rights, supra note 1, at 636.
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scandal or crisis hits. That is the way most reforms develop-many
provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley are examples.
Moreover, it is possible that further reform is politically achievable in
the next few years. Change in the system for electing directors seems the
most promising area currently for significant reform. Should Bainbridge's
Burkean caution scare us off from this sort of change right now, so soon
after Sarbanes-Oxley and related developments? I do not think so. Really
significant reform in corporate governance does not come terribly often for
powerful political reasons-people with great clout are hurt by such reform,
and usually they can block it. It takes a moment of significant scandal or
crisis to make big change possible. We may still be in such a moment in the
aftermath of the bursting of the dotcom bubble, Enron, and the like.
Reformers should take what the system will give them when they can-there
is no telling when the next chance will come. If this moment turns out to
have passed, these reform ideas will then be out there for the next moment. I
return to these points in the next section.
Sometimes Bainbridge's Burkean/survivalist argument takes on a
comparative edge: the U.S. economy has done well relative to other
countries, and our corporate governance system is part of that success.
Hence, we should be wary of change. In The New Corporate Governance
and several recent articles he makes this point using the following quote
from Bengt Holmstrom and Steven Kaplan:
Despite the alleged flaws in its governance system, the U.S.
economy has performed very well, both on an absolute basis
and particularly relative to other countries. U.S. productivity
gains in the past decade have been exceptional, and the U.S.
stock market has consistently outperformed other world indices
over the last two decades, including the period since the
scandals broke. In other words, the broad evidence is not
consistent with a failed U.S. system. If anything, it suggests a
system that is well above average.
197
There are several problems with this sort of argument. For one, it is
cyclical. Back in the 1980s and early 1990s, it was Japanese and German
197Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, The State of U.S. Corporate Governance: What's
Right and What's Wrong? 1 (European Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper Series in Finance,
Paper No. 23/2003, 2003), available athttp'//papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn? abstractjid=441 100,
cited in BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 152-53; Shareholder Disempowerment, supra note 1, at
1739-40; Unocal at 20, supra note 1, at 828.
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corporate governance that people looked to, as those countries grew rapidly.
In the later 1990s, U.S. triumphalism became common. Today, all three
countries' systems look rather suspect.
98
A second problem with this comparative argument is that it ignores
many elements, besides corporate governance, that help explain the macro-
economic performance of economies. The link between corporate govern-
ance and economic growth is tenuous.199 Did the United States outperform
Japan and Germany in the nineties because of its corporate governance
system? Or, was it due to wiser monetary policy, better fiscal policy, more
favorable demographics, a more flexible labor market, a leaner welfare
system, or a host of other possible factors that are plausibly relevant?
I should note that at this point Bainbridge is unwilling to push the
implicit U.S. triumphalism of the Holmstrom and Kaplan quote very far at
all. Indeed, in the introduction to The New Corporate Governance, he
stresses that his analysis "focuses exclusively on corporate governance in the
United States. ,200 He says it may be that director primacy is not "optimal in
an absolute sense, but only relative to the set of possibilities defined by our
legal system.",
20 1
Despite that disclaimer, it would be interesting to see Bainbridge pay
much closer attention to comparative corporate governance in future work.
Some of the key rules favoring director primacy that he points to in
American, and especially Delaware, corporate law do not exist in other
countries. In many advanced countries, shareholders can amend the
corporate charter on their own; mergers require shareholder, but not board,
approval.2°2 Boards face greater legal restrictions in opposing hostile
takeovers.2 °3 Shareholders can more easily nominate directors. A leading
example of such a jurisdiction is the United Kingdom, which otherwise
resembles the United States more so than most other countries. Yet
somehow despite these big gaps in board primacy, British companies seem
to do pretty well for themselves. If Bainbridge's core arguments were
correct, it is hard to see how that could be so. Another problem is that the
relative success of the American system, if true at all, may be due more to
198See Brett H. McDonnell, Convergence in Corporate Governance-Possible, But Not
Desirable, 47 VILL. L. REV. 341, 381 (2002).
199See id. at 360.2
°BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 13.
201id
202See REINIER R. KRAAKMAN ET AL, THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 139-40 (2004).
203See id. at 164-68.
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our federal securities law than to state corporate law,2° and Bainbridge tends
to be more skeptical of federal than state law. I would like to see how he
explains corporate law outside the United States-it poses a real challenge to
his theory.2 °5
Let us pause to see where Bainbridge's arguments have taken us. He
has given us a strong account of the role of fiat authority within large public
corporations. He has also helped explain why a group, rather than an
individual, stands at the apex of the corporation's authority relationships. He
has also, however, presented us with a puzzle as he first grants the impor-
tance of balancing authority and accountability, but then almost immediately
moves to arguing that we should almost always favor the former over the
latter, unless powerful arguments counsel otherwise in particular cases.
We have searched for how Bainbridge justifies this move from
recognizing two competing virtues to his stance of almost always siding with
one virtue over the other. We now see that the search has been in vain.
Bainbridge's most distinctive and characteristic argument is what I have
called the Arrowian moment. Arrow, however, only takes us as far as
recognizing the existence of the authority/accountability trade-off. He does
not tell us how to make the trade-off. Bainbridge can only invoke Arrow in
making this choice by implicitly painting his opponents as proposing an
extreme position in which all board authority is lost. In real life today,
though, we do not face that choice.
Bainbridge tries to buttress his position with a variety of more
traditional arguments: the dynamics of boards themselves, the wonders of
markets, the race to the top in corporate law, the evils of special interest
institutional investors, and the evolutionary advantages of sticking with a
proven status quo. None of his arguments in these areas succeed in bringing
us out of the point/counterpoint battles of decades of corporate law
scholarship. Each of these arguments gives us some reason to believe that
the Delaware and United States status quo deserves some respect, but for
each there are also good reasons to believe that the status quo could be
usefully changed.
2
°4The leading body of work on comparative corporate and securities law suggests that
vigorous protection of shareholders tends to lead to more successful securities markets. For a recent
summary of that work by three of the leading researchers, see Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic
Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 285 (2008).
20
sBainbridge has made a brief foray into the comparative corporate law thicket in Stephen
M. Bainbridge, Director v. Shareholder Primacy in the Convergence Debate, 16 TRANSNAI'L L. 45
(2002). In that piece, however, he pays little attention to the systems of other countries, and the non-
U.S. jurisdiction that he does discuss as a case study is Slovenia, not exactly one of the leading
alternatives to the United States. Id. at 53-55.
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A final dynamic to note is the interaction of all the various account-
ability mechanisms that Bainbridge discusses. Even though each of them is
flawed in the various ways considered above, they all do, to some degree,
help make boards more accountable. Furthermore, successful accountability
does not depend on any one of the mechanisms alone. They are all in play.
Thus, even if one accepts my critique of each of the particular accountability
mechanisms described above, perhaps the net effect of all of them combined
works to constrain boards pretty well, and hence there is no need to move in
the direction of greater accountability.
Perhaps, but there is no real reason to believe that is true. Maybe the
mechanisms collectively currently achieve the optimal level of account-
ability, but is there any affirmative reason to believe this is true? Have they
reached the optimal level by luck? That is an implausible story. To make
this final argument work, one would have to show some mechanism whereby
the corporate governance system as a whole, in all its complexity and various
elements, was guided to the optimal level of authority and accountability.
The most obvious place to look for such a mechanism is an efficient market
story, but we have considered that above and found that Bainbridge does not
adequately explore the arguments for and against market efficiency, and
there are plenty of arguments against. Is there any other sort of mechanism
that pushes all of the above factors collectively to an optimal level of
accountability? I cannot think of one, and Bainbridge does not present us
with anything beyond the arguments already considered above. Indeed, the
evolutionary story he tells involves plenty of regulatory interventions
favoring increased accountability, and it seems quite likely that further
interventions like that will be called for in the future.
V. FOR MORE ACCOUNTABILITY
AND LESS AUTHORITY
Where does that leave us? It may not have escaped the reader's notice
that I tend to favor a legal balance tilted more to accountability and less to
authority than Professor Bainbridge advocates. If you accept my arguments
so far, they will have convinced you that he has not succeeded in making a
strong case for the desirability of director primacy. Since this is the best
existing defense of that system, which essentially characterizes actual
American practice, this is of note.
That, however, does not provide a set of affirmative arguments for
reforms that would create more accountability for corporate directors. If
accepted, I have helped undermine some of the best arguments against such
reforms, but serious change should have some affirmative reasons in its
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favor. Does anything observed so far point the way to such affirmative
reasons?
Bainbridge, following Arrow, provides a starting point. They are
right-there is indeed a trade-off between authority and accountability, and
both matter. Any corporate governance system that moves to an extreme of
no authority or no accountability is likely to experience serious problems.
Moreover, Bainbridge is right that the U.S. system has moved awfully far in
the direction of favoring authority over accountability-far enough that we
should worry about nearing the vicinity of point E in Figure 2, where we
have all authority and no accountability. That is not a good place to be.
The arguments above in rebuttal of Bainbridge help push this point
further. Do the internal dynamics of boards themselves succeed in adequate
self-regulation, so that government regulators and shareholders need to do
nothing? Even on Bainbridge's own account, outside regulators have a
serious role to play in encouraging better internal board dynamics. Do
market accountability mechanisms make legal accountability devices
unnecessary? We have seen that there are serious problems in each of the
relevant markets.206 Does state competition help reassure us that state law
will reach an optimal balance? There are good reasons to doubt that.20 7 The
growth of institutional investor activism provides some hope that there will
be shareholders who can and will exercise greater power if such is granted to
them.208 Our current system has indeed served us pretty well in some basic
sense, but that is, in part, precisely because it has been open to constant
evolution over time, evolution often guided by a need to create more
accountability.2° With the memory of some of the greatest scandals in the
history of corporate governance still quite fresh, now does not seem like a
natural time to cut off this evolution in its tracks and stand pat.
I admit, however, that each of these points has counterpoints. How do
we work our way out of this situation to a sensible evaluation of the proper
balance between authority and accountability? One possible place to look is
for a more detailed empirical study of the effects of different legal rules,
including a comparative analysis across different countries. Although,
traditionally, law and economics scholarship has been light on such
210
empirical work, that has changed in recent years. 0 Perhaps more, and
2
°6See supra notes 141-56 and accompanying text.207See supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.208See supra notes 168-78 and accompanying text.2
°9See supra notes 184-203 and accompanying text.
2 1
°See, e.g., Kate Litvak, The Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Non-U.S. Companies
Cross-Listed in the U.S., 13 J. CORP. FIN. 195 (2007); Guhan Subramanian, Post-Siliconix
Freezeouts: Theory and Evidence, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2007); Robert Daines, Does Delaware
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better, empirical scholarship will help us put rough figures to the costs and
benefits of different rules, and figure out which changes make sense and
which ones do not.
Perhaps. It cannot hurt, and it will probably do some good. Serious
empirical research in corporate law scholarship is welcome and past due. I
do think that contemporary empiricists probably focus too much on
econometric methodology-there are other ways of doing interesting and
worthwhile empirical research, and we should also see more of those
techniques. That quibble aside, more empirical research is clearly a part of
the way forward.
Yet, I doubt that even vastly expanded empirical research is going to
settle this debate. It will give us a clearer view of the effects of corporate
law and help refine arguments on various sides. However, each side in the
great debate between authority and accountability will find compelling
empirical evidence for its preferred policies, which does not mean such
research is not worth doing. It is unrealistic to expect any sort of academic
writing to definitively settle this sort of dispute.
Part of the reason for the unending nature of this dispute is that it is
not just a debate over what set of policies will maximize net corporate
output. Other great and important values besides efficiency are at stake here,
and drive proponents on both sides. It is no accident that the great defender
of authority within corporations is a leading Burkean Catholic intellectual.
Most of Professor Bainbridge's arguments are couched in terms of efficiency,
as is expected of corporate law scholars today. Great values such as
tradition, order, liberty, just dessert, and respect for earned authority,
however, are just under the surface in his scholarship.
The other side (my side) has its own great values. These include an
abhorrence of corruption and misused power, equality and respect for the
common man, the public good, democracy, and a more affirmative sense of
freedom (positive liberty, in Isaiah Berlin's terms) 211 that focuses on the
ability of all persons to fully develop their personal capabilities. A more
honest and expansive form of corporate law scholarship than currently
prevails among American legal academics would develop the relationship
between corporate law and these values, and tie them to the great debates
over efficiency that have dominated scholarship over the last few decades.
Law Improve Firm Value? (Columbia Law Sch. Ctr. for Studies in Law & Econ., Working Paper
No. 159, 1999), available at httpJ/papers.ssm.con/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=195109. Most
important of all is the econometric work on shareholder protections and legal origins started by La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny. For a summary, see La Porta et al., supra note 204.
21 'ISAIAH BERUN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in THE PROPER STUDY OF MANKIND 118
(1997).
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Professor Bainbridge would, I expect, be able to do a great job in making
such arguments on one side of this great debate.212
A different sort of argument for greater accountability focuses on the
political economy of lawmaking in this area. Scholars hope to influence
policy developments with some of their writing, even if it does not happen
nearly as often as they would like. Is there any reason to think that one side
or the other in the great authority/accountability debate is more in need of
whatever sort of aid scholars may be able to provide?
There is. The political deck is stacked in favor of managers and
boards and against shareholders (and even more so against other corporate
constituencies).213 Managers and boards are a more concentrated interest
group than shareholders and hence, for traditional free riding reasons, are
better able to organize politically.214 Managers and the board also control
the choice of the state of incorporation and, hence, states vying for
incorporations are prone to cater more to their interests. Within Delaware,
the well-organized corporate bar tends to mostly promote the interests of
215management and directors. Managers and boards also have the consider-
able resources of the corporations they manage to pursue their preferred
216policy agenda-they do not have to spend their own money. 6 For all of
these reasons, the policy behind both state and federal (but especially state)
corporate law naturally tends to favor manager and board over shareholder
interests. The political tendency is to lead to a balance of authority and
accountability that leans too far in the direction of authority.
If scholars want to affect that balance, they can serve a useful role by
fighting against this political tendency. Scholars, who are mostly insulated
from the material pressures that tend to favor managers and boards, can be a
voice for those with less incentive or resources to speak for themselves.
Finally, let us return to Arrow. We have seen reason to believe that
Bainbridge overplays Arrow's arguments. Arrow emphasizes the importance
of both authority and accountability. Bainbridge at first does so, too, but
then almost invariably sides with authority over accountability. Nothing in
212I attempt to make some of these arguments on the other side in McDonnell, supra note
32.
2131 discuss the evidence surrounding this point in McDonnell, supra note 165.
214See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS (1965) (explaining his theory that organizations produce "public goods"-
goods or services available to every member even if every individual did not endure the costs of
providing such goods or services).2 15See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of
Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469,485 (1987).2 16See McDonnell, supra note 32, at 363-64.
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Arrow supports that choice. A brief consideration of the historical context
for Arrow's masterwork may help deepen our understanding of how
Bainbridge misuses Arrow.
Arrow delivered the lectures on which his book was based in 1971.217
He was an economics professor at Harvard-a part of the liberal establish-
ment. That establishment was under radical attack at the time. Students
were besieging not just the government, but the offices of university
presidents and deans as well. Ideas of participatory democracy were
widespread. Authority was treated with contempt.
But authority was not acquitting itself terribly well either. The
Vietnam War was the leading example, but not the only one. Corporations
were, by Bainbridge's own account, much more managerialist than they are
now. Thinking people had become aware of the racism and sexism that
pervaded authority structures. Elite universities were hidebound places to
help induct the children of the privileged into their own privileged futures.
And so on.
As a member of the liberal elite, Arrow was trying to maintain a
middle ground at a time when that was quite an uncomfortable position. He
affirmed the great benefits of authority against the then-current radical
attacks against all kinds of authority. He also, however, stressed that
authority figures and institutions needed to be held accountable. The
country's great institutions did need to be held accountable, but reform, not
revolution, was the right way forward. Hold our leaders more accountable,
yes, but do not go so far as to undermine valid authority that serves real,
useful purposes. This, as I see it, was the core message of Arrow's lectures.
Bainbridge goes wrong by taking sentences aimed at student activists
in the late 1960s and using them against contemporary shareholder activists.
Lucian Bebchuk is not Tom Hayden.218 Point D in Figure 2 (sacrificing all
authority in the name of accountability) was a live political option (at least in
intellectual circles) in the early 1970s. That was Arrow's target, insofar as he
defended authority. Bainbridge's target is very different. Contemporary
shareholder activists and their scholarly allies are leading a much less radical
attack on authority. Arguments that accurately hit Arrow's target miss their
mark when aimed at Bainbridge's target. Let us end, then, with the words
that end Arrow's book, words that are a call for more accountability:
217ARROW, supra note 9.2 18For that matter, Tom Hayden in 2008 is not Tom Hayden in 1971.
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Clearly, there is no consensus on the need for responsibility and
certainly not on its scope or on the mechanisms for its achieve-
ment. But the unthinking acceptance of authority based on
echoes from religion and kingship is, I believe, gone....
Authority is undoubtedly a necessity for successful
achievement of an organization's goals, but it will have to be
responsible either to some form of constitutionally planned
review and exposure or to irregular and fluctuating tides of
disobedience.219
219ARROW, supra note 9, at 79.
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